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YAIGUAJE v. CHEVRON
CORPORATION: TESTING THE
LIMITS OF NATURAL JUSTICE
AND THE RECOGNITION OF
FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN
CANADA
Lucien J. Dhooge"
"[T]he day will soon come when Canadian courts will have to
address fairness issues arising out of judgments rendered by courts with
systems of justice substantially different from that prevailing in the local
forum."'

Abstract
This article analyzes Canadian litigation seeking recognition of an
$18.2 billion judgment entered against Chevron in Ecuador in 2011 in
what has been labeled as the world's largest environmental lawsuit.
The article examines Chevron's involvement in Ecuador through its
predecessor in interest (Texaco) and the history of proceedings in
Ecuador and the United States. The article then discusses the
recognition of foreign judgments in Canada with particular emphasis
upon the natural justice defense. The article concludes this defense
presents significant issues affecting the reputation and credibility of
the Canadian judiciary and its liberal approach with respect to
recognition of foreign judgments.
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I. Introduction
On May 30, 2012, forty-seven residents of the Sucumbios province
of Ecuador (Plaintiffs) filed a statement of claim against the Chevron
Corporation, Chevron Canada Limited and Chevron Canada Finance
Limited in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice. 2 The Statement of

Claim sought recognition and enforcement of an $18.25 billion
judgment entered against Chevron by the Provincial Court of Justice
of Nueva Loja in the Sucumbios Province of Ecuador on February 14,
2011 and affirmed by the Appellate Division of the Provincial Court
on January 3, 2012. 3
Filed in Ecuador in May 2003, the Plaintiffs' claims arose from
past and ongoing environmental contamination resulting from oil and
gas operations conducted by a consortium in which Texaco, Inc.
(Texaco) participated from 1964 through 1992. 4 The Ecuadorian

2.

Statement of Claim, Yaiguaje v. Chevron Corp., No. CV-12-454778
(Ont. Super. Ct. J., May 30, 2012, Can.) [hereinafter Statement of
Claim or Claim]; see also David Baker, Chevron Sued in Canada by
Ecuadorians over Pollution, S.F CHRON., May 31, 2012, available at
http://www.sfgate.com/2012/05/31/MNOO1OPV2E.DTL.
All
references to "Chevron" throughout this article will be to Chevron
Corporation unless otherwise stated.

3.

Statement of Claim, supra note 2,
1(a). See also Judgment, Aguinda v.
ChevronTexaco Corp., No. 2011-0106 (App. Div. Prov. Ct. J., Jan. 3,
2012, Ecuador); Judgment, Aguinda v. ChevronTexaco Corp., No.
002003 (Prov. Ct. J., Nueva Loja in Lago Agrio, Feb. 14, 2011,
Ecuador) [hereinafter Judgment].

4.

Complaint at 4-14, Aguinda v. ChevronTexaco Corp., No. 002-2003
(Super. Ct. J., Nueva Loja in Lago Agrio, May 7, 2003, Ecuador)
[hereinafter Lago Agrio Complaint or Complaint]. Chevron was named

proceedings have been complicated by allegations of fraud, bribery,
corruption, violations of due process, and procedural irregularities5
and related proceedings in the United States6 and before the
Permanent Court of Arbitration.7
The value of the judgment is entirely dependent on its recognition
outside of Ecuador as Chevron maintains no assets in the country.
Rather than proceed with recognition proceedings in the United
States, the Plaintiffs initiated the first proceeding seeking recognition
in Canada. Although not Chevron's domicile or the location of its
most significant assets, the selection of Canada is nevertheless logical.
Developments in Canadian case law in the past ten years have led
commentators to characterize Canada as "one of the most hospitable
jurisdictions in the world for the recognition and enforcement of
judgments from foreign jurisdictions."' This hospitality is consistent
with the Plaintiffs' strategy of seeking enforcement in "jurisdictions
that offer the path of least resistance to enforcement" and have "the
most favorable law and practical circumstances." 9
This article examines the status of the Ecuadorian judgment
pursuant to Canadian law relating to natural justice. The article
initially examines the history of Texaco's investment in Ecuador's
petroleum industry, the environmental impacts allegedly resulting
from this investment, and the history of proceedings in the United
States and Ecuador and before the Permanent Court of Arbitration.
as a defendant as a result of its October 2001 acquisition of Texaco. Id.
at 8, 19.
5.

See, e.g., Appeal of Chevron Corp., Aguinda v. ChevronTexaco Corp.,
No. 2011-0106, 10-186 (App. Div. Prov. Ct. J., Mar. 21, 2011, Ecuador);
see also infra notes 48-78 and accompanying text.

6.

See, e.g., Complaint at 119-46, Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, No. 1 -CV107-24 and
0691 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2011); see also infra notes
accompanying text.

7.

See Claimants' Notice of Arbitration at 7-16, Chevron Corp. v. Republic
of Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2009-23 (Permanent Ct. of Arbitration, Sept.
23, 2009) [hereinafter Chevron Notice of Arbitration]; see also infra
notes 123-26 and accompanying text.

8.

H. Scott Fairley, International Issues in National Courts: Recent
Developments in Private Litigation: Open Season: Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in CanadaAfter Beals v. Saldanha,
11 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 305, 316 (2005) (describing this liberal
approach as "an overly generous adoption to twentieth and twenty-first
century circumstances of the nineteenth century common law doctrine
[of comity]"); see also infra note 184 and accompanying text.

9.

Patton Boggs LLP, Path Forward: Securing and Enforcing Judgment
and Reaching Settlement 7-8, 12-13, 17-21 (undated), available at
http://www.earthrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/Invictusmemo.pdf (detailing Plaintiffs' worldwide enforcement strategy should
they secure a judgment in Ecuador).

The article then examines the recognition of foreign judgments in
Canada with particular emphasis upon the Canadian Supreme Court's
opinions

in Morguard Investments Ltd. v. DeSavoye

and

Beals v.

Saldanha rand subsequent
provincial opinions. The article then
examines natural justice grounds for non-recognition of foreign
judgments in Canada and their potential application in this case.
Although Chevron may be able to establish a defense based upon
natural justice, its burden is substantial and presents significant risks
for the company. Additionally, the recognition action presents
significant issues potentially affecting the reputation and credibility of
the Canadian judiciary.
II. Texaco in Ecuador: A Brief History
Hydrocarbon Exploration and Texaco's Investment

Although a comprehensive history of hydrocarbon exploration in
Ecuador and Texaco's operations are beyond the scope of this article,
a review of the factual background is necessary in order to place the
issues regarding recognition of the Judgment in their proper context.
Texaco and Gulf Oil Corporation (Gulf) were invited by the
Ecuadorian government to conduct exploratory activities in the
Oriente region in March 1964.12 Texaco and Gulf formed a consortium
(Consortium) through their Ecuadorian subsidiaries to conduct this
exploration with Texaco serving as the operator.13 The Consortium
discovered oil in commercial quantities in 1967 and began export
operations in 1972.

10.

[1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077.

11.

[2003] 3 S.C.R. 416.

12.

Third Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility
3.5, Chevron
Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2009-23 (Permanent Ct. of
Arbitration, Feb. 27, 2012) [hereinafter Third Interim Award].

13.

The Consortium agreement was between Compania Texaco de Petroleos
del Ecuador, a subsidiary of Texaco Ecuador, and Gulf Ecuatoriana de
Petroleo, a subsidiary of Gulf Ecuador. See Phoenix Canada Oil Co. v.
Texaco, Inc., 658 F. Supp. 1061, 1065 (D. Del. 1987). The Plaintiffs
alleged Texaco was responsible for the "design, construction, installation
and operation of the infrastructure and necessary equipment for the
exploration and exploitation of the crude oil." See Lago Agrio
Complaint at 5, Aguinda v. ChevronTexaco Corp., supra note 4. But see
Third Interim Award, supra note 12,
3.8, 3.9 (stating "[t]hroughout
the term of the Consortium's concession, the Ecuadorian Government
regulated, approved and, in many instances, mandated the Consortium's
activities; and no facilities were constructed, nor wells drilled, nor oil
extracted without the Government's oversight and approval" and that
"the [Government of Ecuador] and PetroEcuador held full regulatory
control over the Consortium").

The Consortium's operations were modified in September 1971 as
a result of a new regulatory regime governing concession areas
granted to foreign oil companies. These regulations limited the size of
concession areas, increased the royalties payable to the government,
and decreed that "[t]he deposits of hydrocarbons and accompanying
substances, in whatever physical state, located in the national
territory . . . belong to the inalienable ...patrimony of the State."' 4
Texaco and Gulf were required to relinquish a portion of the
concession area to the state-owned oil company Compania Estatal
Petrolera Ecuatoriana (CEPE) in June 1972.11 A new concession
agreement was executed in August 1973 which granted CEPE
participation rights in the Consortium commencing in 1977 which
date was subsequently advanced to June 1974.16 Texaco and Gulf
executed an agreement granting CEPE a 25% interest in the
Consortium in June 1974.17 Gulf transferred its remaining 37.5%
interest to CEPE in December 1976 in exchange for $82.1 million. 8
From 1977 to 1990, the Consortium operated with Texaco and
CEPE/PetroEcuador as the participants and Texaco as the
operator. 19 On July 1, 1990, Petroamazonas, a subsidiary of
PetroEcuador, replaced Texaco as the operator.2 0 Ecuador did not
renew the concession agreement upon its expiration in June 1992.21 At
the time of the termination of Texaco's interest, the Consortium had
extracted more than 1.4 billion barrels of oil from the concession
area. Ninety percent of the revenues generated by the Consortium
during its existence (approximately $23 billion) were paid to the
14.

Phoenix Canada Oil Co., 658 F. Supp. at 1066 (quoting Hydrocarbons
Law, arts. 40B, 43, 45 (1971) (Ecuador)).

15.

CEPE was subsequently reorganized and became PetroEcuador. See
Republic of Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco Corp., 376 F. Supp.2d 334, 339
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (discussing CEPE's organization and operations).

16.

See id. at 339 (discussing the effective date of the August 1973
concession agreement and the January 1974 decree commencing CEPE's
participation in June 1974).

17.

3.6
See Third Interim Award, supra note 12,
negotiation and execution of the concession agreement).

18.

See id.

19.

Kimerling, Indigenous People and the Oil Frontier in
See Judith
Amazonia: The Case of Ecuador, ChevronTexaco, and Aguinda v. Texaco,
38 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 413, 420 (2006).

20.

See Third Interim Award, supra note 12,

21.

See id.

22.

Complaintat 22, Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4718
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 1994) (No. 93 Civ. 7527); see also Kimerling, supra

(discussing

the

3.10.

3.11.

note 19, at 449-50 (utilizing production estimates
Ministry of Energy and Mines).

from

Ecuador's

Ecuadorian
government through revenues, royalties, taxes and
subsidies.23 Texaco received approximately
$500 million as a result of
24
its participation in the Consortium.
The Consortium's impact on the environment has been the source
of considerable dispute.25 These impacts were addressed in 1990 when
PetroEcuador and Texaco retained two consulting firms to conduct
environmental audits. 6 The audits estimated the total cost of
environmental remediation to be between $8 million and $13 million. 7
In May 1995, Ecuador (by and through its Ministry of Energy and
Mines), PetroEcuador and Texaco entered into an agreement wherein
Texaco agreed to perform environmental
remediation work on
designated sites in return for a release from further obligations
relating to the impact of the Consortium's activities. 8 Texaco
obtained approval of remediation plans for each designated site from
Ecuador and PetroEcuador.29 Texaco spent $40 million in these efforts
from October 1995 through September 1998.30 The Ecuadorian
23.

See Third Interim Award, supra note 12,

3.9.

24.

Id.

25.

See, e.g., Lago Agrio Complaint, supra note 4, at 11-14 (alleging
environmental contamination through the discharge of more than 464.7
million barrels of formation waters); AMAZON DEFENSE COALITION,
RAINFOREST CATASTROPHE: CHEVRON'S FRAUD AND DECEIT IN ECUADOR

4 nn.8, 11 (2006) (estimatingthat 17.1 million gallons of crude oil were
discharged as a result of drilling activities and pipeline ruptures). But
see Doug Cassel, Defrauding Chevron in Ecuador: Doug Cassel's Reply
to the Plaintiffs' Legal Team 11-12 (Apr. 10, 2012) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the author) (summarizing findings by Chevron's
epidemiological and environmental experts that there was little or no
environmental impact or public health concerns relating to ground
water, drinking water and soil).
26.

See Third Interim Award, supra note 12,
3.10; see also Texaco, Inc.,
History of Texaco and Chevron in Ecuador, Remediation (2004),
available at http://www.texaco.com/sitelets/ecuador/en/remediation/
default.aspx.

27.

See Third Interim Award, supra note 12,

28.

Id.

3.16-3.17.

29.

Id.

3.20-3.21.

30.

Id.
3.21, 3.24. For a detailed description of Texaco's remediation
activities, see Press
Release,
Chevron Corporation, Inspection by
Environmental Experts Confirms that Texaco Conducted an Effective
Cleanup in Full Compliance with its Obligations to the Government 2
(Mar. 24, 2004) (on file with author). The $40 million cost of
remediation included two payments of $1 million each for socioeconomic projects. See Third Interim Award, supra note 12,
3.22. The
cost also included payments totaling $3.7 million to the municipalities of
Lago Agrio, Shushufindi, Joya de los Sachas and Francisco de Orellana
in return for their withdrawal of lawsuits and a release from all current
and future liability. Id.

3.10.

government

issued numerous

actas documenting

its acceptance

of

Texaco's remediation efforts during these three years. 3' On September
30, 1998, the Ecuadorian government and PetroEcuador signed the
"Act of Final Liberation of Claims and Equipment Delivery" in which
they recognized that Texaco had fulfilled its obligations pursuant 2to
the 1995 agreement and released it from current and future liability.
III. Texaco in Ecuador: The Resulting Litigation
Litigation in the United States

In November 1993, seventy-four Ecuadorians filed a class action
lawsuit against Texaco in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York. 33 The plaintiffs purported to represent more
than 30,000 persons residing in the Oriente region who had suffered
damages from hydrocarbon contamination as a result of the
Consortium's operations. 34 The complaint was dismissed on the basis
of forum non conveniens in 2001, which dismissal was upheld by the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 35 The dismissal was
31.

Third Interim Award, supra note 12,

3.26.

32.

Id. See also Republic of Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco Corp., 376 F.
Supp.2d 334, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (quoting the Final Act as declaring
Texaco's obligations pursuant to the 1995 agreement were "fully
performed and concluded" and that the government and PetroEcuador
"proceeded to release, absolve, and discharge [Texaco and its related
companies] from any liability and claims by the Government of the
Republic of Ecuador, PetroEcuador and its affiliates, for items related to
the obligations assumed by [Texaco] in the 1995 Settlement").

33.

See Complaint, Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4718
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 1994) (No. 93 Civ. 7527).

34.

Id. at 4, 11, 14-15, 17-18. The plaintiffs stated causes of action sounding
in negligence, public and private nuisance, strict liability, trespass, and
civil conspiracy. Id at 27-35.

35.

Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470 478-80 (2d Cir. 2002). The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded Ecuador was
adequate for purposes of forum non conveniens analysis. Id. (citing
Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 890 F. Supp.1324, 1359-60 (S.D. Tex. 1995)
(mass tort litigation arising from pesticide exposure); Ciba-Geigy, Ltd.
v. Fish Peddler, Inc., 691 So.2d 1111, 1117 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)
(tort litigation arising from fungicide exposure)). This conclusion was
also based upon the Second Circuit and district court's independent
inquiries. SeeAguinda, 303 F.3d at 478. Ecuador was also an adequate
alternative forum due to the absence of impropriety by Texaco or the
Consortium in any prior judicial proceeding in Ecuador, the absence of
corruption in previous cases, and the existence of close public and
political scrutiny, which would prevent the application of undue
influence upon the court. Id. For its part, the Ecuadorian government
contended all natural resources and land, including that upon which the
Consortium conducted its operations, were owned by the government,

contingent upon Texaco's agreement to being sued in Ecuador on
these or similar claims, accept service of process in Ecuador, and
waive any statute of limitations defense for claims expiring between
the date of the filing of the U.S. litigation and one year after its
dismissal.36
Litigation in Ecuador:The Trial andProceduralIssues
The Plaintiffs initiated litigation against Chevron in Ecuador in
May 2003. The Plaintiffs based their lawsuit upon provisions of the
Ecuadorian Constitution3 7 and the Environmental Management Law
of 1999 that recognized a "popular action to denounce the breaching
of environmental laws . . . and [obtain] damages . . . for the
deterioration of . . .health [and] damage to the environment."3 8 The
Plaintiffs requested Chevron remove all contaminants and repair
environmental damages caused by their presence.39 Additionally, the
Complaint sought remittance of ten percent of the cost of remediation
work to Frente de Defensa de la Amazonia (Frente)4 ° The amount of
damages was not specified.
Chevron asserted numerous defenses which were summarized in
its Motion to Dismiss filed in October 2007. First, Chevron contended
that the Environmental Management Law could not be applied
and any decision by a foreign court was an affront to national
sovereignty. See Motion to Dismiss for Chevron Corp. at 16, Aguinda v.
ChevronTexaco Corp., No. 002-2003 (Super. Ct. J., Nueva Loja in Lago
Agrio, Oct. 8, 2007, Ecuador) [hereinafter Chevron Motion to Dismiss].
The Ecuadorian government condemned "the plaintiffs' attorneys in this
matter for attempting to usurp rights that belong to the government of
the Republic of Ecuador under the Constitution and laws of Ecuador
and under international law." Id.(quoting Letter from Edgar Terin,
Ecuadorian Ambassador to the United States, to Jed S. Rakoff, U.S.
District Court Judge (June 10, 1996)).
36.

Aguinda, 303 F.3d at 478-80.

37.

Constitution arts. 23, 86-88, 90-91 (1998) (Ecuador) (guaranteeing
citizens the right
to live in a healthy environment, declaring
environmental protection and the preservation of biodiversity to be in
the public interest, requiring public consultation and approval of
decisions affecting the environment, requiring the government to
regulate the production, distribution, and use of substances dangerous to
human life and the environment, and placing responsibility for
environmental damage occurring during the delivery of public services
upon the government). All references to the Ecuadorian Constitution
contained herein shall be to the 1998 version, which was in force and
effect at the time of the filing of the Lago Agrio Complaint.
Environmental Management Law, Law No. 99-37, arts. 41, 43 (July 30,

38.

1999) (Ecuador).
39.

Lago Agrio Complaint, supra note 4, at 22-25.

40.

Id.at 25.

retroactively to the Consortium's

operations 4' and was inconsistent

with the Ecuadorian government's previously-stated position that the
country's natural resources belonged to the nation and thus could not
be the subject matter of private litigation.42 Second, Chevron alleged
the claims were barred by the 1994 and 1995 remediation agreements
and 1998 release. 43 Chevron also claimed that the Plaintiffs sued the
wrong entity by failing to assert claims against Texaco. 44 Other
defenses raised by Chevron included the
lack of personal jurisdiction,
45
the statute of limitations and standing.

The Superior Court deferred ruling on these defenses and
commenced proceedings in October 2003. In order to expedite and
simplify the collection and analysis of evidence, the court accepted a
joint plan consisting of judicial inspections of designated well sites to
determine the presence of environmental contamination followed by
expert determination of the cause of any contamination and the cost

of remediation. 46 One hundred twenty-two well sites were designated
for sampling and analysis, and forty-seven of these sites were
ultimately
41.

inspected. 47

However,

further

collection

and

analysis

Chevron Motion to Dismiss, supra note 35, at 10-18. Chevron contended
the Ecuadorian Constitution, Civil Code and applicable case law
prohibited retroactive application of the law. See Constitution art. 24.1
(1998) (Ecuador) (stating "[n]o one may be judged for an act or
omission which at the time it was committed was not legally classified
as a . . . violation, nor

.

.

.

. shall

a person

be judged

except

in

accordance with preexisting laws"); CODIGO CIVIL [C. civ.] art. 7
(Ecuador) (stating "[t]he law provides only for the future; it has no
retroactive effect"); Calva v. Petroproduccion, Case No. 349-2000
(Super. Ct., Nuevo Loja, Aug. 20, 2001) (Ecuador) (in which the court
held the Environmental Management Law could not be applied
retroactively against a production subsidiary of PetroEcuador as private
individuals did not possess such rights before 1999).
42.

See supra note 35 and accompanying text.

43.

Chevron Motion to Dismiss, supra note 35, at 9.

44.

Id. at 18-19.

45.

Chevron alleged Texaco's consent to personal jurisdiction in Ecuador
and waiver of the four year statute of limitations were not binding as
Chevron was not a party to the Aguinda litigation in the United States
and was not Texaco's successor-in-interest. Id. at 19-20. The standing
defense was based upon the Environmental Management Law, which
requires plaintiffs bringing an action on behalf of the public demonstrate
individualized harm. See Environmental Management Law, Law No. 9937, art. 43 (July 30, 1999) (Ecuador) (stating "[t]he natural or juridical
persons or human groups, linked by common interest and affected
directly by the harmful act

or omission,

may

damages and losses and for deterioration caused
environment").
46.

Chevron Motion to Dismiss, supra note 35, at 22.

47.

Id. at 23-24.

file . . . actions for

to health or to the

became enmeshed in controversies concerning methodology48 and the
credibility of a report submitted by one the Plaintiffs' experts.49 The
joint collection plan was abandoned by the Superior Court in July
2006. Despite having rejected previous similar requests submitted by
the Plaintiffs, the court issued an order waiving further inspections by
experts appointed by both parties and appointing a single expert to
conduct inspections and prepare a report."
The court appointed Richard Cabrera (Cabrera) as the sole expert
to determine the existence and source of environmental damage and
specify the appropriate remedial work.5 Based upon his review of 48
48.

Chevron submitted reports on forty-five sites, which purportedly
demonstrated that ninety-eight percent of the waste pits remediated by
Texaco met the standards established by the Ecuadorian government
and ninety-nine percent of the drinking water samples met safety
standards established by the World Health Organization and the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency. See Chevron Corporation's Rebuttal
Brief at 7, Aguinda v. Chevron Texaco Corp., No. 002-2003 (Super. Ct.
J., Nueva Loja in Lago Agrio, Sept. 15, 2008, Ecuador) [hereinafter
Chevron Rebuttal Brief]. Chevron contended that the Plaintiffs' experts
failed to report data on more than half of the 465 soil and water samples
they collected and submitted only 5 of these samples to an accredited
laboratory for analysis. Chevron Motion to Dismiss, supra note 35, at
28-29. Chevron alleged the remaining samples were sent to unaccredited
laboratories which reported the presence of contaminants for which it
did not test and attributed all metals found in soil samples to the
Consortium's activities. Id. at 29.

49.

The report at issue was prepared by Dr. Charles Calmbacher. Chevron
alleged Calmbacher discussed his proposed findings with Plaintiffs'
counsel in advance and was instructed what his findings were to be. See
Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp.2d 581, 605-06 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(in which Calmbacher stated that one of Plaintiffs' representatives "told
him that 'he wanted the answer to be that there was contamination and
people were injured ... [b]ecause it makes money. That's what wins his
case'). A related allegation was that the report was authored by the
Plaintiffs' litigation team and submitted without Calmbacher's approval
as evidenced by his subsequent disavowal of its contents. Id. at 606
(concludingthat there is "evidence that persons acting on behalf of the
[Plaintiffs] prepared reports expressing views contrary to Calmbacher's
and submitted those fictitious reports to the . . . court over his name").

50.

Chevron objected to this order as inconsistent with the previouslyagreed procedures and a violation of the Civil Code. Chevron Motion to
Dismiss, supra note 35, at 37-38; see also CODIGO CIVIL [C. civ.] arts.
252, 292 (Ecuador) (stating that the parties may "by mutual agreement
select the expert or request the appointment of more than one expert to
carry out [expert examination], which agreement shall be binding on the
judge" and that litigant's requests "whose objective is to alter the
meaning of . . . orders . . . or to maliciously prejudice the other party,
shall be dismissed and sanctioned").

51.

Chevron's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 35, at 37. Chevron objected to
Cabrera's appointment due to his lack of qualifications in hydrocarbon
chemistry, epidemiology, hydrogeology, remediation technologies, and oil

well sites, 1 production station and aerial photographs, Cabrera
concluded that eighty percent of the waste pits and one hundred
percent of the production station pits needed to be remediated.52
Chevron objected to Cabrera's methodology53 and accused him of
disregarding his mandate54 and misconduct. 5 Chevron concluded the
and gas operations practices. Id. at 38. Chevron also alleged the
Plaintiffs were provided with advance knowledge regarding Cabrera's
appointment and paid him prior to the commencement of his work.
Although not conclusive, at least one U.S. court noted there was:
at least the possibilities that the judge agreed to the global
assessment in general and to appoint Cabrera in particular in
exchange for the [Plaintiffs'] agreement not to file a complaint
against the judge, and Cabrera, the supposedly independent
court appointee, was paid money up front and promised future
consideration by the [Plaintiffs] in the event they prevailed.
Chevron Corp., 768 F. Supp.2d at 607.
The district court concluded that there was "substantial evidence of
irregularity relating to the appointment and independence of Cabrera."
Id. at 606; see also Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, No. ll-CV-00691-LAK,
at 32-35 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2012) (opinion on partial summary
judgment motion) (detailing ex parte communications between
Plaintiffs' representatives and the Superior Court regarding Cabrera's
appointment in 2006 and 2007).
52.

Press Release, Chevron Corporation, Ecuador Lawsuit Report Has
Fabricated Evidence, Tainted by Political Pressure 2 (Sept. 15, 2008)
(on file with author).

53.

See Chevron Rebuttal Brief, supra note 48, at 4, 11 (expressing "grave
inappropriate"
"superficial
and
concerns"
regarding
Cabrera's
methodology and procedures); see also Chevron Motion to Dismiss,
supra note 35, at 40, 43 (accusing Cabrera of conducting limited
sampling, extrapolating individual results over the entire area of the
Consortium's operations and failing to maintain chain of custody for
samples).

54.

See Chevron Rebuttal Brief, supra note 48, at 4-6, 17 (accusing Cabrera
of failing to perform a detailed assessment of more than 300 well and
production sites in the concession area, evaluating social and economic
conditions in the Oriente without judicial authorization, assessing
"billions of dollars to compensate for alleged personal injuries, to
improve public services, to foster indigenous cultures, to modernize
PetroEcuador's equipment, and to take away alleged 'unfair profits'
and going "on a roving patrol and, using innuendo and speculation,
attempt[ing] to ascribe to [Texaco] endemic social problems that are
plainly not of its making").

55.

See Chevron Notice of Arbitration, supra note 7, at 12 (accusing
Cabrera of employing Plaintiffs' supporters in conducting his fieldwork);
see also Chevron Rebuttal Brief, supra note 48, at 4, 6, 8, 11-14
(accusing Cabrera of manipulating and altering evidence, failing to
disclose his methodology, acting in complicity with the Plaintiffs,
utilizing unqualified personnel to conduct sampling and testing, barring

utilization of Cabrera's report by the court would be a violation of
Ecuador's Constitution.56
In April 2008, Cabrera assessed damages of $16.3 billion, which
included amounts for wrongful death, environmental remediation, the
establishment of health
care facilities,
the construction of
infrastructure for PetroEcuador, and the disgorgement of profits
earned by Texaco in Ecuador.57 Cabrera increased this estimate to
$27.3 billion in November 2008." 8 The new damages estimate included
multi-billion dollar awards for cancer deaths purportedly resulting
from hydrocarbon contamination, groundwater and soil remediation,
healthcare funding, the construction of potable water systems and an
unjust enrichment penalty.59 The new estimate exceeded Chevron's

Chevron representatives from locations while sampling was occurring,
and collaborating with Plaintiffs' attorneys in the preparation of his
report); Chevron Motion to Dismiss, supra note 35, at 42-44 (accusing
Cabrera of failing to notify Chevron representatives of dates and times
for sampling and destroying exculpatory evidence (including clean soil
samples) and concluding the inspection process was "marked by rank
amateurism, disregard for scientific protocol, and irredeemable bias").
56.

Constitution arts. 13, 22, 24, 192 (1998) (Ecuador) (providing, in part,
that foreigners have the same rights as Ecuadorians, that the state is
liable for "judicial error . . . [and] the inadequate administration of
justice," that every person is entitled to due process, including "the

right to access to the judicial

organs

and to obtain the effective,

impartial and expedited protection of their rights and interests," and
that "the procedural systems [of the state] shall . . . effect to the
guarantees of due process").
57.

CHEVRON CORP., ANNUAL REPORT

58.

Id.

59.

FRENTE

DE

DEFENSA

DE

LA

47 (2008).

AMAZONIA,

$27

BILLION

DAMAGES

ASSESSMENT, 1-2 (2009),
available at http://chevrontoxico.com/
abouthistoric-trial/27-billion-damages-assessment.html. Chevron alleged

the assessment for cancer deaths failed to identify the alleged victims,
produce supporting documentation, distinguish between types of cancer,
and provide an explanation for its inconsistency with official Ecuadorian
statistical data on cancer mortality. See Chevron Rebuttal Brief, supra

note 48, at 17. The court's failure to strike this portion of the damages

assessment was noteworthy given the fact that similar claims were
deemed frivolous in related litigation occurring in the United States. See
infra notes 108-10 and accompanying text. The unjust enrichment
penalty was criticized as lacking a basis in Ecuadorian law and grossly
excessive in comparison to the actual profits derived by Texaco from the
Consortium's operations. See CHEVRON CORP, REBUTTAL TO
THE
SUPPLEMENTAL EXPERT REPORT 7 (2009); see also supra note 24 and
accompanying text.

net earnings in 2008 and was almost twice the amount of net earnings
60
derived from its international operations.
In addition to its previously-noted objections, Chevron alleged the
damages estimates were inflated. Cabrera's estimated $1 billion in soil
remediation costs were for locations that he did not visit or waste pits
that did not exist. 6' Cabrera's estimate set the cost of remediation of
waste pits at $2.2 million per pit when PetroEcuador, with the
government's approval, was remediating its pits at a cost of $85,000
per pit. 62 Cabrera's conclusions further placed responsibility for all
impacts upon Texaco and failed to attribute any
environmental
responsibility to PetroEcuador.6 1 Chevron also alleged the estimate
relating to the improvement of Ecuador's potable water system was
tainted by Cabrera's failure to take a single drinking water sample."4
According to Chevron, Cabrera's "sole interest was to facilitate the
result sought by plaintiffs' counsel and the Government of Ecuador: a
windfall damages judgment against a U.S. oil company that never
operated in Ecuador and had nothing to do with the Consortium."65
Cabrera's report was further undermined by evidence that
portions were authored by the Plaintiffs' representatives. 66 In
apparent concern about this allegation, the Plaintiffs sought new

60.

Chevron had net earnings of $23.9 billion in 2008, of which $14.5 billion
were derived from its international operations. CHEVRON CORP., ANNUAL
REPORT,

61.
62.

supra note 57, at 34.

See Chevron Notice of Arbitration, supra note 7, at 11; see also
Chevron's Rebuttal Brief, supra note 48, at 6.
See CHEVRON CORP., TEXACO PETROLEUM, ECUADOR AND THE LAWSUIT
10 (2009).

AGAINST CHEVRON

63.

See Chevron Notice of Arbitration, supra note 7, at 11.

64.

CHEVRON CORP., TEXACO PETROLEUM,
AGAINST CHEVRON, supra note 62, at 10.

65.

CHEVRON CORP.,

ECUADOR AND

THE

LAWSUIT

REBUTTAL TO THE SUPPLEMENTAL EXPERT REPORT,

supra note 59, at 3.
66.

See Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp.2d 581, 611 (S.D.N.Y.
2011) (concluding there was a "likelihood" that the Cabrera report was
"planned" by some of the Plaintiffs' representatives, written "in
substantial part" by persons other than Cabrera and submitted as
Cabrera's independent work product without disclosure of its true
authorship); see also Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, No. 1 l-CV-00691LAK,

at 38-39 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2012) (opinion on partial summary

judgment motion) (detailing the authorship of the Cabrera report and
concluding that "there is no genuine dispute as to exactly what
happened" with respect to the report's authorship and that the report

"falsely or, at least, deceptively stated that it had been 'prepared by . .
Cabrera' with the help of 'my technical team, which consists
impartial professionals"').

of

reports supporting Cabrera's conclusions. 67 However, the new authors
completed their work in less than one month without visiting
Ecuador, conducting site inspections, taking new samples, or
conducting new tests and relied heavily upon data and analysis
6
contained in the Cabrera report. 1
Chevron also claimed the Superior Court was influenced by
political pressure exerted primarily by Ecuadorian President Rafael
Correa upon his assumption of office in January 2007. This pressure
included
statements referring to the Plaintiffs'
counsel as
"compafieros," offering government support to the Plaintiffs, and
pledging to assist in evidence gathering. 69 President Correa also called
upon Ecuador's Prosecutor General to indict persons involved in the
remediation agreements and release.7" Pressure was also exerted by
the Ecuadorian Attorney General's office, 7 members of Ecuador's
67.

Chevron Corp., 768 F. Supp.2d at 611. The district court
such efforts as a "cleansing operation." Id. at 610.

68.

Id. at 611; see also Chevron Corp., No. 1 I-CV-00691-LAK, at 40-42
(detailing the "cleansing" reports, noting that six of the seven experts
completed their work without visiting Ecuador to gather data and
concluding that at least four of the seven experts relied upon data and
conclusions set forth in the Cabrera report).

69.

See, e.g., Chevron Rebuttal Brief, supra note 48, at 8 (quoting
President Correa as offering government support to the Plaintiffs and
pledging to assist them in evidence gathering); Chevron Notice of
Arbitration, supra note 7, at 9-10 (alleging "the Government made clear
that any judge who issued opinions contrary to the Government's
interests would be subject to dismissal and even possible criminal
prosecution" and quoting President Correa as denouncing the "barbarity
committed by that multinational corporation [Texaco]"); CHEVRON
CORP., TEXACO PETROLEUM, ECUADOR AND
CHEVRON, supra note 62, at 2, 7 (quoting

THE

referred

LAWSUIT

to

AGAINST

a statement by President
Correa referring to the Plaintiffs' counsel as "compafieros").
70.

See, e.g., Chevron Corp., 768 F. Supp.2d at 615 (quoting
Correa as urging the criminal prosecution of the PetroEcuador
and Texaco's local counsel as "homeland-selling lawyers");
Rebuttal Brief, supra note 48, at 8 (quoting a statement by
Correa labeling Texaco's representatives as "traitors . .. who
dollars are capable of selling souls, country [and] family");
CORP.,

TEXACO

CHEVRON,

Correa

PETROLEUM,

supra note

calling

upon

ECUADOR

AND

THE

President
officials
Chevron
President
for a few

CHEVRON
LAWSUIT AGAINST

62, at 2, 7 (quoting a statement by President

Ecuador's Prosecutor General to

indict

the

"miserable Mafiosi" involved in the remediation agreement and final
act). Two Ecuadorian attorneys who had represented Texaco in the
negotiation and approval of these documents were criminally charged by
the Ecuadorian Prosecutor General in August 2008. See Chevron Notice
of Arbitration, supra note 7, at 13-14.
71.

Chevron Notice of Arbitration, supra note 7, at 8-9 (quoting
correspondence from Ecuadorian Deputy Attorney General Martha
Escobar to one of Plaintiffs' attorneys that "the Attorney General's
Office and all of us working on the State's defense [a]re searching for a

Constituent Assembly72 and protestors allegedly organized by the
Plaintiffs.73 These events led Chevron to conclude that "the thumbs of
politics are weighing heavily on the scales of justice."7
Another concern was the integrity of presiding judge Juan
Evangelista Nufiez Sanabria (Nufiez) and his replacement Judge
Nicolas Zambrano Lozada (Zambrano). Nufiez was alleged to have
made numerous prejudicial statements regarding the outcome of the
case even before he had begun reviewing the 145,000 pages of
evidence.75 Additionally, videotaped conversations between Nufiez,
private contractors and Ecuadorian government officials in which the
potential outcome of the litigation was discussed surfaced in August
2009.76 Chevron called upon Ecuador's Prosecutor General to conduct
way to nullify or undermine the value of the remediation contract and
the final acta and our greatest difficulty [lies] in the time that has
passed").
72.

See Rebuttal Brief, supra note 48, at 8-9 (referencing statements by
members of the Constituent Assembly endorsing the Plaintiffs' lawsuit
and placing the entire impact of hydrocarbon exploitation on Texaco).

73.

CHEVRON CORP., TEXACO PETROLEUM, ECUADOR AND THE LAWSUIT
AGAINST CHEVRON, supra note 62, at 7 (alleging protestors organized by

the Plaintiffs assailed the presiding judge on June 14, 2006). Plaintiffs'
representative Steven Donziger described these tactics as "something
you would never do in the United States, but Ecuador... this is how
the game is played, it's dirty." Id.
74.

Juan Forero, In Ecuador,High Stakes in Case Against Chevron, WASH.
POST, Apr. 28, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/04/27/AR2009042703717
(quoting Chevron
spokesman James Craig).

75.

See Chevron Notice of Arbitration, supra note 7, at 12.

76.

See Press Release, Chevron Corporation, Videos Reveal Serious Judicial
Misconduct and Political Influence in Ecuador Lawsuit 1 (Aug. 31,
2009) (on file with author). The four recorded meetings occurred in May
and June 2009 and involved Carlos Patricio Garcia Ortega, a political
coordinator for President Correa's Alianza Pais political party; Juan
Pablo Novoa Velasco, a lawyer representing the Ecuadorian government;
Aulo Gelio Servio Tulio Avila Cartagena, a lawyer with alleged
connections to Nuhiez; Pablo Almeida, an environmental remediation
contractor; Rub6n Dario Miranda Martinez, an assistant to Patricio

Garcia; Diego Borja, a former Chevron contractor; and Wayne Hansen,
an American businessman. Letter from Thomas F. Cullen, Jr., Attorney,
Jones Day, to Washington Pesdintez Mufioz, Prosecutor General of
Ecuador (Aug. 31, 2009) (on file with author). Nufiez participated in
two of these meetings in his chambers in Lago Agrio and in Quito. Id.
According to Chevron, the videotaped meetings between the Ecuadorian
government officials and the contractors established that: (1) the
Ecuadorian government was "managing Judge Nufiez"; (2) Chevron
would lose the trial; (3) the Ecuadorian government "provided lawyers
to help craft the opinion against Chevron"; (4) Judge Nufiez was
instructed by President Correa's advisors on how to route the judgment
money; and (5) President Correa's Alianza Pais political party would

an investigation, the disqualification
of Nufiez from further
participation in the case and the voiding of his previous rulings.77
Nufiez recused himself from the case on September 4, 2009 at the
request of the Prosecutor General, and the case was reassigned to
Zambrano.78
Litigation in Ecuador: The Judgment andAppeal

The Superior Court entered the Judgment awarding more than
$17.2 billion in damages against Chevron in February 2011. 7' The
Superior Court concluded Texaco violated Ecuadorian law including
provisions relating to hydrocarbon operations in the country and the
protection of water resources." The court concluded that the evidence
supported an award of $8.64 billion for environmental remediation as
well as awards for personal injuries and property damage.8
While
disclaiming any reliance on the Cabrera report, the court did consider

"give the Judge his share of the bribe money." Letter from Thomas F.
Cullen, Jr., Attorney, Jones Day, to Washington Pesfntez Mufioz,
Prosecutor General of Ecuador, supra at 2. The two meetings in which
Nufhez participated allegedly established that: (1) Chevron was to lose
the trial and any subsequent appeal; (2) Nufiez would award damages of
approximately $27.3 billion; (3) the Ecuadorian government would
receive a portion of the award; and (4) "[t]he American government
would tell Chevron: You lost the trial, so pay up." Id.
77.

Id. See also Press Release, Chevron Corporation, Videos Reveal Serious
Judicial Misconduct and Political Influence in Ecuador Lawsuit, supra
note 76, at 2 (calling upon the Ecuadorian government to "conduct a
full investigation of this matter - focusing not only on the conduct of
Judge Nufiez, but also on the very serious indications of political
interference in this case").

78.

See Simon Romero & Clifford Krauss, Under Pressure, Ecuadorian
Judge Steps Aside in Suit Against Chevron, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2009,
available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2O09/O9/O5/world/americas/
05ecuador.html. Zambrano was removed from the bench in March 2012
on the basis of allegations of lenient treatment of narcotics traffickers.
See Press Release, Chevron Corporation, Judge Who Issued $18.2
Billion Ruling Against Chevron Removed from Bench I (Mar. 8, 2012)
(on file with author).

79.

Judgment at 170-86, Aguinda v. ChevronTexaco Corp.,

No. 002003

(Prov. Ct. J., Nueva Loja in Lago Agrio, Feb. 14, 2011, Ecuador).
80.

Id. at 62-64, 70.

81.

Environmental
injuries
included soil
remediation
($5 billion),
groundwater remediation ($600 million), restoration of flora and fauna
($200 million) and delivery of potable water ($150 million). Id. at 17782. Health-related injuries included hydrocarbon exposure ($1.4 billion),
increases in the prevalence of cancer ($800 million), and forced
displacement as a result of environmental damage ($100 million). Id at
170-71, 183-84.

information in the later-submitted studies.82 The court also imposed
$8.64 billion in punitive damages, which award would be vacated if
Chevron issued a public apology within fifteen days of entry of the
Judgment.8" The entire amount of damages was to be placed in a
trust to be administered by Frente or its designee and utilized for
performance of the remedial measures contemplated by the court's
84
opinion.
The Superior Court rejected several of Chevron's defenses. The
court held Chevron's merger with Texaco was a means by which to
evade liability for the injuries caused by the Consortium." It was thus
appropriate to pierce the veil and disregard corporate formalities.86
The court similarly pierced the corporate veil between Texaco and its
Ecuadorian subsidiary due to a lack of administrative autonomy and
perceived
subsidiary's
and
the
assets
of
separation
undercapitalization. 87 The court also held the remediation agreements
and release were governmental acts and were not binding on
Ecuador's citizens.8 8 The court determined the application of the
Environmental Management Act was not retroactive as it did not
create new substantive rights but only created new procedures by
which such rights could be asserted. 89 The court refused to attribute
any portion of the damages award to PetroEcuador as it was not a
party to the litigation and its complicity could not extinguish
Chevron's liability for existing injuries. 9°
The Judgment was affirmed on appeal by the Sole Division of the
Provincial Court of Justice of Sucumbios in January 2012. 9' The

83.

Id. at 57-58. Nevertheless, the court concluded there were "no defects in
the appointment of expert Cabrera or in the delivery of his report." Id.
at 50. The court refused to conduct a proceeding investigating claims of
fraud and irregularities as the incidents were isolated and would not
affect the outcome. Id. at 50, 99.
Id.at 185-86.

84.

Id. 186-87.

85.
86.

Id. at 11-13.
Id. at 13, 15.

87.
88.

Id. at 20-25.
Id. at 30-32.

89.

The new procedures were the designation of the court possessing
jurisdiction and the manner in which such claims were to be presented.
Id. at 27-28.
Id. at 123.
Judgment, Aguinda v. ChevronTexaco Corp., No. 2011-0106, at 15-16
(App. Div.. Prov. Ct. J., Jan. 3, 2012, Ecuador). The appellate court's
only modification was with respect to the Superior Court's finding of
mercury contamination as a result of the Consortium's activities. Id. at
16.

82.

90.
91.

appellate court rejected Chevron's defenses relating to Texaco's
application
of the
corporate existence, the retroactive
separate
Environmental Management Act and the remediation agreements and
release.92 The appellate court concluded that the environmental and
personal injuries were causally linked to Texaco's hydrocarbon
production activities, were "legally proven," and thus not subject to
modification.9 3 The court affirmed the punitive damages award in
order to "discourage [Chevron's] type of procedural conduct ...thus
setting an example of what should not occur in a legal action." 4
The court declined to address Chevron's allegations of fraud
arising from the Plaintiffs' conduct occurring throughout the
proceedings.95 The basis for this refusal was pending litigation in the
United States which deprived the court of jurisdiction "to rule on the
conduct of attorneys, experts or officers or administrators of justice
and similar parties, if this were to be the case."96 The court also
refused to overturn the Judgment on the basis of Chevron's allegation
that the Superior Court considered evidence external to the record
and had received covert assistance in drafting its opinion due to
Chevron's failure to raise these allegations prior to its appeal. 97 It was,
in the appellate court's opinion, unlikely that such assistance, if it had
Despite these
been provided, would have proven decisive.98
conclusions, the appellate court abstained from further commentary in
order to preserve "the parties' rights to present [a] formal complaint
to the Ecuadorian criminal authorities or to continue the course of the
actions that have been filed in the United States."9 9 The appellate
court's opinion and clarification order are presently under review by

92.
93.

Id. at 3, 6-7, 10.
Id. at 12.

94.

Id. at 15. The appellate court further held that Chevron had engaged in
bad faith throughout the course of the proceedings and in pursuing its
appeal. Id.

95.

Id. at 10.

96.

Id. See also infra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.

97.

See Clarification Decision at 4, Aguinda v. ChevronTexaco Corp., No.
2011-0106 (App. Div. Prov. Ct. J., Jan. 13, 2012, Ecuador).
Id. According to the appellate court, it also was not the court's
responsibility to "make a pronouncement on the interminable and
reciprocal accusations over misconduct of some of the parties' attorneys,
experts, or contractors ...[because these allegations of fraud] could not
affect the final result of the lawsuit." Id. at 5. Chevron had furthermore
failed to identify any "samples, documents, reports, testimonies,
interview [sic], transcripts and minutes" referenced by the Superior
Court that were not in the record. Id. at 4.

98.

99.

Id. at 5.

Ecuador's National Court of Justice pursuant to a cassation petition
filed by Chevron on January 20, 2012.00
Recognition Proceeding in Canada
Despite the pendency of Chevron's appeal, on May 30, 2012, the
Plaintiffs filed their Statement of Claim seeking recognition of the
Judgment in Canada.11 There are three important allegations
contained in the Statement of Claim. The Plaintiffs initially allege
Texaco's consent to recognize any judgment entered in Ecuador given
in 2002 is binding on Chevron. 102 Second, the Plaintiffs allege the
facts, findings, and conclusions of law contained in the Judgment are
res judicata and not subject to relitigation in Canada. 103 Finally, the
administrative, financial,
provides
Chevron
claim
Plaintiffs
for
both of the named
support
management, and technology
subsidiaries and that their management is subject to control by
The subsidiaries' financial
committee. 4
Chevron's executive
performance is consolidated with and reported on behalf of Chevron,
and Chevron guarantees their debts. 105 The Plaintiffs do not contend
the subsidiaries engaged in wrongdoing but rather that their
relationship to Chevron renders their joinder necessary "in order to
achieve equity and fairness between the parties and to yield a result
that is not 'too flagrantly opposed to justice."" 6

100. See Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, No. 11-CV-00691-LAK, at 17-18
(S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2012) (opinion on partial summary judgment

motion) (discussing Chevron's cassation petition).
101. Statement of Claim, supra note 2. Chevron Corporation, Chevron
Canada Limited and Chevron Canada Finance Limited were named as
defendants in the Statement of Claim. Chevron Corporation is a
Delaware corporation with its principal place of business located in
California. See CHEVRON CORP., FORM 10-K (2012). Chevron Canada
Limited is a British Columbia corporation headquartered in Vancouver
and is a wholly owned subsidiary of Chevron Corporation. CHEVRON
CORP., CHEVRON IN CANADA 1 (2011). Chevron Canada Limited is
engaged in retail and commercial fueling operations and distribution of
lubricants in British Columbia and Alberta and operates a refinery in
Burnaby, British Columbia. Id. Chevron Canada Finance Limited is a
Chevron subsidiary incorporated in Alberta with its principal place of
business located in Calgary. Bus. WK., COMPANY OVERVIEW OF
CHEVRON CANADA FINANCE, LTD.

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

1 (2012).

Statement of Claim, supra note 2, at 5.
Id.at 6
Id.at 6-7.
Id.
Id.at 7-8.

Related Proceedings in the United States
There are three related proceedings in the United States that may
have an effect upon recognition of the Judgment in Canada and other
locations in the future. The first proceedings involve claims alleging
hydrocarbon pollution caused by the Consortium's operations resulted
in the development of cancer by Oriente residents. These claims were
dismissed by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California in 2007 which concluded the claims were "manufactured by
plaintiffs' counsel" and "likely a smaller piece of some larger scheme
against

defendants.'

0 7

The

district court

subsequently

imposed

sanctions on three of plaintiffs' counsel for failure to conduct adequate
inquiry with respect to the cancer claims prior to initiating
litigation. 08 The district court described the plaintiffs' case as
consisting of "bogus claims that should never have been on the
'
books."' 09
Discovery requests initiated by Chevron seeking evidence to be
utilized in Ecuador and before the Permanent Court of Arbitration
generated a second set of opinions by several U.S. federal courts in
2010 and 2011.110 The most extensive findings addressing these
requests were set forth in In re the Application of Chevron

107. Gonzalez v. Texaco, Inc., No. C 06-02820, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56622,
at *9 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2007).
108. Gonzalez v. Texaco, Inc., No. C 06-02820, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81222,
at *33 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2007). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11
provides, in relevant part, that:
By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing,
submitting, or later advocating) a pleading, written motion, or
other paper, an attorney ... is certifying that to the best of the
person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an
inquiry reasonable under the circumstances
(3) the allegations and other
factual contentions have
evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to
have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for
further investigation or discovery .
FED. R. Civ. P. ll(b)(3).
The district court ordered sanctions in the amount of $45,000. Gonzalez,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81222, at *41. The plaintiffs' attorneys in the
California litigation are different from Plaintiffs' counsel in Ecuador.
109. Gonzalez, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81222, at *40.
110. These discovery requests were initiated pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1782
(2010) which provides, in part, "[t]he district court of the district in
which a person resides or is found may order him to give his testimony
or statement or to produce a document or other thing for use in a
proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal."

Corporation.'" The district court denied a motion to quash subpoenas
seeking documents and testimony and concluded there was "evidence
of possible fraud and misconduct" by one of Plaintiffs' counsel whose
activities "had little to do with the performance of legal services and a
great deal to do with political activity, intimidation of the Ecuadorian
courts, attempts to procure criminal prosecutions for the purpose of
extracting a settlement, and presenting a message to the world
media.""' 2 These findings led the court to conclude discovery was
appropriate as these activities were more similar to those of a
lobbyist, public relations consultant, media representative and
political organizer than an attorney." 3 Furthermore, the court found
"more than a little evidence" that some activities came within the
crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege and the work
product doctrine." 4 The outcome of the Ecuadorian litigation may
also have been influenced by politics, judicial intimidation and
corruption." 5 According to the court, the Cabrera report was not the
work product of a neutral expert, and another expert's report was
submitted without the witness' authorization." 6 The district court's

111.

749 F. Supp.2d 141 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).

112. Id. at 144, 157-58.
113. Id. at 163.
114. Id. at 167.
115. Id. at 145 (quoting Plaintiffs' counsel as stating ....[y]ou can solve
anything with politics as long as the judges are intelligent enough to
understand the politics ....
they don't have to be intelligent enough to
understand the law, just as long as they understand the politics"); see
also id at 146 (concluding one of Plaintiffs' counsel "attempted to
intimidate the Ecuadorian judges [and] obtain political support for the
Ecuadorian lawsuit"); Id. at 147 (quoting Plaintiffs' counsel as stating
"[tihe only language that I believe this judge is going to understand is
one of pressure, intimidation and humiliation," that such conduct was
necessary as the only method by which to secure a fair trial given that
"[t]he judicial system is so utterly weak" and that Ecuadorianjudges are
"all corrupt! It's - it's their birthright to be corrupt"); Id. at 155-56
(discussing the involvement of President Correa in the Ecuadorian
litigation); Id. at 158-59 (discussing Plaintiffs' suggestion to "organize

pressure demonstrations at the court" and the judge's fear of bodily
harm should he rule against the Plaintiffs).
116. Id. at 144-45, 150, 152 (determining there was substantial evidence that
"(1) Cabrera was appointed as a result of Lago Agrio plaintiffs' ex parte
contacts with and pressure on the Ecuadorian courts, (2) at least part of
his report was written by consultants retained by the Lago Agrio
plaintiffs, and (3) the report was passed off as Cabrera's independent
work"); see also id. at 152 (discussing the submission of an expert
witness' report of which the witness subsequently denied authorship).
See also supra note 48 and accompanying text.

conclusions have been echoed by other U.S. courts in similar discovery
proceedings." 7
In February 2011, Chevron filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York in which it accused the
Plaintiffs, two of their attorneys, Frente, and an environmental
consulting company of colluding with numerous non-party coconspirators to corrupt the judicial process in Ecuador in order to
extort a settlement payment from Chevron." 8 Chevron's lawsuit
accused the defendants
of pressuring the Ecuadorian
court and
manufacturing evidence, colluding with the Ecuadorian government to
bring sham criminal charges against Chevron's local counsel,
distributing false information to the media and federal and state
government officials, and obstructing its domestic discovery efforts by
making false or misleading representations to federal courts,
tampering with witnesses and withholding documents." 9 Chevron
alleged these activities violated numerous federal and state laws. 2 °
117. See, e.g., In re Application of Chevron Corp., 633 F.3d 153, 166 (3d
Cir. 2011) (determining that a conflict of interest relating to one of the
Plaintiffs' consultants was "sufficient to make a prima facie showing of
fraud"); Chevron Corp. v. E-Tech Int'l, No. 1Ocv1 146-IEG (WMc), 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94396, at *17 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2010) (holding the
crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege to be applicable as
"[t]here is ample evidence in the record that the Ecuadorian Plaintiffs
secretly provided information to Mr. Cabrera, who was supposedly a
neutral court-appointed expert, and colluded with Mr. Cabrera to make
it look like the opinions were his own"); In re Chevron Corp., No. 10MC-21JH/LFG, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119943, at *6 (D.N.M. Sept. 1,
2010) (noting the presence of "inappropriate, unethical and perhaps
illegal conduct"); Chevron Corp. v. Camp, No. l:10mc27, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 97440, at *16 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 30, 2010) (concluding "that
what has blatantly occurred in this matter would in fact be considered
fraud by any court .... If such conduct does not amount to fraud in a

particular country, then that country has larger problems than an oil
spill").
118. Complaint at 17-97, Chevron
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2011).

Corp.

v.

Donziger,

No.

11-CV-0691

119. Id. at 31-73. Specific factual allegations in this regard include utilizing
pressure tactics to influence the Superior Court, colluding with
Ecuadorian government officials to influence the outcome of the
litigation and inducing expert witnesses to prepare and file biased and
false reports. Id. at 31-46. Chevron also alleged Plaintiffs' counsel met
with Cabrera prior to his appointment, staged mock inspections,
authored his report, remitted payments for work he did not perform and
attempted to "launder" the report once significant questions about the
credibility of Cabrera and his report emerged. Id. at 46-73. Seealso id.at
73-114.
120. Nine of the named defendants were alleged to have engaged in a pattern
of activities in violation of the Racketeer-Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO). Id. at 119-33; seealso 18 U.S.C. §1962(c)
(2010) (providing it shall be unlawful for "any person employed by or

Chevron sought awards of general, treble and punitive damages as
well as equitable relief enjoining the defendants or any of their agents
from attempting to obtain recognition or enforcement of the
Judgment in any court, tribunal, or administrative agency in the
United States or abroad.2 ' The case remained pending at the time of
the preparation of this article.2 2
Related Proceeding before the Permanent Court of Arbitration

A final related proceeding is Chevron's statement of claims
pending against the Republic of Ecuador in the Permanent Court of
Arbitration filed in September 2009. Chevron alleged the Ecuadorian
government colluded with the Plaintiffs and abused the criminal
justice system in violation of the Ecuador-United States Bilateral
Investment Treaty. 123 To date, the Court has determined the claims
associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which
affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly
or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a
pattern of racketeering activity or collection of an unlawful debt"). The
specific racketeering activities alleged in the complaint are: (1) extortion
in violation of the Hobbs Act (18 U.S.C. §1951 (2010)); (2) extortion in
violation of New York state law (N.Y. PENAL LAW §§110.00,
155.05(2)(e), 155.42 (2010)); (3) mail and wire fraud (18 U.S.C. §§ 1341,
1343 (2010)); (4) money laundering (18 U.S.C. §1956(a)(2)(A)(2010)); (5)
obstruction of justice (18 U.S.C. §1503 (2010)); and (6) witness
tampering (18 U.S.C.
§1512 (2010)). See Complaint, Chevron Corp. v.
Donziger, No. 11-CV-0691, at 121-27. These actions were also alleged to
constitute a conspiracy in violation of RICO. Id. at 17-97; see also 18
U.S.C. §1962(d) (2010) (providingthat it shall unlawful to conspire to
engage in racketeering activities). Ancillary state law claims of fraud,
tortious interference with contract, trespass to chattels, unjust
enrichment and civil conspiracy were stated against all defendants with
the exception of the claim for relief alleging violation of the New York
Judiciary Law, which was limited to one of the defendants' attorneys
and his law office. Complaint, Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, No. 11-CV0691, at 119-46. The New York Judiciary Law provides, in part, that
"[a]n attorney or counselor who ... [i]s guilty of any deceit or collusion,
or consents to any deceit or collusion, with intent to deceive the court
or any party ... is guilty of a misdemeanor and . . .forfeits to the party
injured treble damages, to be recovered in a civil action." N.Y.
JUDICIARY LAW §487 (2010).

121. Complaint, Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, No. 1 -CV-0691, at 146-47.
122. The district court dismissed the fraud, tortious interference
contract, trespass to chattels and unjust enrichment claims in May
but refused to dismiss the claims based upon RICO and the New
Judiciary Law.
See Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, No. 11 Civ.
(LAK), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67207, at *81-82 (S.D.N.Y. May
2012).

with
2012
York
0691
14,

123. Chevron Notice of Arbitration, supra note 7, at 7-16. Chevron's claims
are based upon Ecuador's failure to provide fair, equitable treatment,
protection and security, and impairment of investments through

to be admissible, and it possesses jurisdiction. 2 4 The Court described
Chevron's claims as "amongst the gravest accusations which can be
advanced by a claimant against a modem State subject to the rule of
law" but nevertheless "serious and not advanced in bad faith; nor ...
incredible, frivolous or vexatious."' 25 The Court has directed Ecuador
on numerous occasions to take all necessary measures to prevent
recognition and enforcement of the Judgment in and outside
Ecuador.'26 Chevron's claims remained pending at the time of
preparation of this article.

IV. The Recognition of Foreign Judgments in Canada
Introduction

Recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in Canada are
governed by provincial law.'27 Thus, there is no single method of
recognition and enforcement.'28 Multi-pronged recognition efforts must

arbitrary and discriminatory measures. Id at 16; see also Investment
Treaty, U.S.-Ecuador, arts. 11(1), II(3)(a-c), 11(7), Aug. 27, 1993, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 103-15. Chevron seeks an order declaring: (1) there is
no continuing liability for any environmental and health impacts
associated with Texaco's participation in the Consortium; (2) Ecuador
breached the bilateral investment treaty; (3) Texaco and its parent
companies, affiliates and successors have been released from liability; (4)
Ecuador and PetroEcuador are exclusively liable for any remaining
environmental and health impacts; and (5) Ecuador indemnify, protect
and defend Chevron from any payment of damages. Chevron also seeks
damages in an amount deemed appropriate by the Court. Chevron
Notice of Arbitration, supra note 7, at 17-18.
124. Third Interim Award, supra note 12,

4.95-4.96.

125. Id. 4 4.57-4.58.
126. See, e.g., Second Interim Award on Interim Measures, Chevron Corp. v.
Republic of Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2009-23,
3(i-ii) (Permanent Ct. of
Arbitration, Feb. 16, 2012); First Interim Award on Interim Measures,
Chevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2009-23,
2(i-ii)
(Permanent Ct. of Arbitration, Jan. 25, 2012); Order for Interim
Measures, Chevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, PCA Case No. 200923,
(E)(i-ii) (Permanent Ct. of Arbitration, Feb. 9, 2011); Order on
Interim Measures, Chevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, PCA Case
No. 2009-23,
l(i-ii) (Permanent Ct. of Arbitration, May 14, 2010).
127.

MARKUS KOEHNEN
& AMANDA KLEIN, THE
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN CANADA

RECOGNITION

AND

2 (2010).

128. Id. at 2; see also IGOR ELLYN

& EVELYN PEREZ YOUSSOUFIAN,
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF MONEY JUDGMENTS IN CANADA
3 (2009) (commenting on the absence of "pan-Canadian uniformity"
with respect to the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments).

proceed on a province-by-province basis although all provinces, except
Quebec, have mutual registration arrangements.129
Canadian law does not permit significant differences between
provinces. 130 Differences are resolved and uniformity imposed by the
Supreme Court of Canada. 3 ' However, appeals are only heard with
leave of the Court in matters of national importance.' 32 Thus, absent
an imperative public interest, the primary determinant of private law
disputes, including matters concerning foreign judgments, remains the
provincial courts.'33 These courts, other than those in Quebec, utilized
common law principles derived from the English system and other
Commonwealth countries prior to the Canadian Supreme Court's
1990 decision in MorguardInvestments Ltd. v. DeSavoye.34
MorguardInvestments Ltd. v. DeSavoye
In Morguard, the Supreme Court of Canada was confronted with
recognition
of
to the
inter-provincial
conflicting approaches
judgments.'35 The judgment debtor asserted the continued relevance
129. See, e.g., Reciprocal Enforcement
(1990).

of Judgments Act,

R.S.O., ch.R.5

130. KOEHNEN & KLEIN, supra note 127, at 2.
131. Id.
132. Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., §41 (1985).
133.

See JANET WALKER, RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN
JUDGMENTS AND ARBITRAL AWARDS IN CANADA §64.01[3] (2003).
Provincial courts have traditionally viewed recognition and enforcement
actions as contractual matters, specifically, the implied obligation of the
judgment debtor to pay the amount of the judgment. See, e.g., Pro
Swing, Inc. v. Elta Golf, Inc., [2006] 2 S.C.R. 612; Livesley v. Horst,
[1924] S.C.R. 605; Rutledge v. U.S. Sav. & Loan Co., [1906] S.C.R. 546;
Burchell v. Burchell, [1926] 58 O.L.R. 515 (S.C.); North v. Fisher, [1884]
6 OR. 206 (High Ct.).

134.

[1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077. For a discussion of English common law, see, e.g.,
Singh v. Rajah of Faridkote, [1894] A.C. 670 (P.C.); Emanuel v. Symon,
[1908] 1K.B. 302 (C.A.).

135. The judgment in question was issued by an Alberta court and sought to
be enforced in British Columbia. The judgment debtor was the
mortgagor of real property located in Alberta. The judgment debtor
subsequently moved to British Columbia. The mortgages fell into
default, and the lenders commenced foreclosure proceedings in Alberta.
Although properly notified of these proceedings, the judgment debtor
did not appear or defend the action. The real properties were
subsequently sold at a judicial sale, and a money judgment was entered
against the judgment debtor for the deficiencies between the value of
the properties at judicial sale and the amounts owing on the mortgages.
The lenders commenced a separate action in the British Columbia
Supreme Court to enforce the Alberta judgments. The Supreme Court
granted judgment to the lenders which judgment was upheld on appeal
by the British Columbia Court of Appeal. The judgment debtor

and applicability of the English approach to recognition. This
approach prevented the recognition of judgments unless the defendant
was a subject of the foreign country in which the judgment was
rendered, resided in the foreign country at the time the civil action
was initiated, selected the foreign forum, voluntarily appeared in the
foreign forum or was bound by an enforceable forum selection
agreement.136 In contrast, the judgment creditor urged the Supreme
Court to adopt a reciprocity approach permitting the enforcement of
in personam judgments entered in other Canadian provinces.'37
Although the concept of territoriality was relevant to the
nineteenth century, the Canadian Supreme Court held "[m]odem
states . . . cannot live in splendid isolation and do give effect to
judgments given in other countries in certain circumstances."' 38
Recognition was based on the "idea of comity, an idea based not
simply on respect for the dictates of a foreign sovereign, but on the
convenience, nay necessity, in a world where legal authority is divided
among sovereign states."' 3 9 Particularly instructive in this regard was
40
the U.S. Supreme Court's definition of comity in Hilton v. Guyot.1

challenged this decision on the basis that he was not a resident of
Alberta and did not attorn to the jurisdiction of its courts. See
Morguard lnvs. Ltd. v. DeSavoye, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077, 1083-84.
136. Id. at 1094 (citing Emanuel v. Symon, [1908] 1K.B. 302 (C.A.)).
137. Id. There was growing support for the concept of reciprocity within the
English and Canadian legal systems in the years preceding Morguard.
See, e.g., Travers v.

Holley,

[1953] 2

All.

E.R.

794,

800 (C.A.)

(recognizing the absence of encroachment upon sovereign and territorial
interests of national courts in a domestic relations action "where it is
found that the municipal law is not peculiar to the forum of one
country, but corresponds with the law of a second country"); Marcotte
v.

Megson,

[1987]

19

B.C.L.R.2d 300

application of reciprocity within
Gilbert D. Kennedy,
Meaning of Reciprocity,
Kennedy, Reciprocity
Implications of Travers v.

(Cty. Ct.)

(upholding the

Canada in personal actions). See also

Recognition of Judgments In Personam: The
35 CAN. BAR REV. 123 (1957); Gilbert D.
in the Recognition of Foreign Judgments: The
Holley, 32 CAN. BAR REV. 359 (1954).

138. Morguard Invs. Ltd., 3 S.C.R. at 1095.

139. Id. at 1096.
140. 159 U.S. 113 (1895) in which the U.S. Supreme Court defined comity as:

[n]either a matter of absolute obligation . . . nor of mere
courtesy and good will. But it is the recognition which one
nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or

judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to
international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own
citizens or of other persons who are under the protections of its
laws.
Id.at 163-64.

This formulation of comity required adjustment to the "changing
world order" of the twentieth century. 4 ' Modem times required the
facilitation of the "flow of wealth, skills and people across state lines
in a fair and orderly manner."' 42 Insistence upon parochial interests in
such a highly integrated world would result in injustice and the
disruption of normal patterns of life.'43 Rigid insistence on territorial
restrictions to recognition and enforcement also "[flew] in the face of
the obvious intention of the Constitution to create a single
country.""' Thus, the Court concluded the previous approach to
recognition and enforcement was "ripe for reappraisal." '45
This reappraisal led the Court to conclude that "the courts in one
province should give full faith and credit ...to the judgments given
by a court in another province or territory, so long as that court has
properly, or appropriately exercised jurisdiction in the action."' 4 6 In
addition to traditional means, the exercise of jurisdiction was
appropriate where there was a "real and substantial connection"
between the original court, the defendant, the cause of action, or the
subject matter of the action. 47 In this case, "a more 'real and
substantial' connection . . . [could] scarcely be imagined" given the
location of the properties, where the contracts were148 signed, and the
residency of all parties at the time of the transaction.
The Court recognized there may be circumstances in the future
which would render inter-provincial recognition and enforcement
imprudent or create injustice. The Court identified several defenses in

141. Morguard Invs. Ltd., 3 S.C.R. at 1097.
142. Id. at 1096. According to the Court, accommodation of the free flow of
wealth, skills and people across national boundaries was "imperative."
Id. at 1098.
143. Id. (citing Arthur T. Von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Recognition
of Foreign Adjudications: A Survey and a SuggestedApproach, 81

144.
145.
146.
147.

148.

HARV. L. Rav. 1601, 1603 (1968)). The Court concluded it would be
"anarchic and unfair that a person should be able to avoid legal
obligations arising in one province simply by moving to another
province. Id.at 1102-03. Such a result was inconvenient, costly and
placed the court in the newly selected forum in a position of deciding a
case to which it had remote, if any, connection. Id. at 1103.
Id. at 1099.
Id. at 1098.
Id. at 1102.
Id. at 1108. For a discussion of traditional means by which courts may
appropriately exercise personal jurisdiction over the parties appearing
before them, see supra note 136 and accompanying text. For a detailed
discussion of the "real and substantial connection" requirement, see
KOEHNEN & KLEIN, supra note 127, at 6-9.
Morguard Invs. Ltd., 3 S.C.R. at 1108.

such circumstances. These defenses included forum non conveniens,
fraud, or conflict with the law or public policy of the recognizing
jurisdiction.'49 Such defenses were not applicable in this case. 50
Beals v. Saldanha
Morguard left undecided the issue of the proper approach to the
recognition of non-Canadian judgments. Provincial courts in the 1990s
applied Morguard to non-Canadian judgments, but such application
was not widespread or uniform.' 5' The appropriate approach to nonCanadian judgments was not addressed by the Canadian Supreme
Court until 2003 in Beals v. Saldanha 5 2 The Court closely equated
foreign and domestic judgments and thus adopted one of the most
liberal recognition and enforcement regimes in the world.
Beals v. Saldanha arose from a Florida state court judgment
entered against three residents of Ontario. ' 3 A majority of the

149. Id. at 1110.
150. Id.
151. Seee.g., Old N. State Brewing Co. v. Newlands Servs., Inc., [1999] 4
W.W.R. 573 (C.A.) (North Carolina judgment); Moses v. Shore Boat
Builders, Ltd., [1993] 106 D.L.R.4th 654 (C.A.) (the first Canadian
appellate court opinion to apply Morguard to a non-Canadian judgment,
specifically, an Alaskan judgment); United States v. Ivey, [1996] 30
O.R.3d 370 (C.A.) (Michigan judgment); Arrowmaster, Inc. v. Unique
Forming, Ltd., [1994] 17 O.R.3d 407 (Gen. Div.) (applying Morguard to

an Illinois judgment and, in so doing, endorsing "the necessity and
desirability, in a mobile global society, for governments and courts to
respect the orders made by courts in foreign jurisdictions with
comparable legal systems, including substantive laws and rules of
procedure").
152. [2003] 3 S.C.R. 416.
153. The judgment debtors sold vacant real property located in Florida
valued at U.S. $8,000 to two Florida residents. The purchasers began
construction of a model home on the property for use in their
construction business. A dispute arose when it was discovered that the
sales contract erroneously identified the real property subject to the
sale, resulting in the purchasers' home being constructed on property
that the judgment debtors did not own. The purchasers filed suit
against the judgment debtors in Florida state court. Although they
initially appeared in the case, the judgment debtors failed to continue
their defense on the advice of counsel that a Florida state court
judgment was unenforceable in Canada. The Florida court subsequently
entered a default judgment against the judgment debtors in the amount
of U.S. $210,000 in compensatory damages and U.S. $50,000 in punitive
damages. The amount of the judgment with interest had increased to C.
$800,000 by the time the purchasers sought recognition in Ontario. The
Ontario Court (General Division) declared the judgment unenforceable
due to perceived fraud in the assessment of damages. A majority of the
Ontario Court of Appeal reversed and held the defenses of fraud and
public policy inapplicable to the question of recognition. The judgment

Canadian Supreme Court elected to apply Morguardto non-Canadian
found "compelling reasons" to expand
judgments. The majority
Morguard's application and no "principled reason not to do so."' 54
These "compelling reasons" included the need for order and fairness
which ensured security of transactions which "necessarily underlie the
modem concept of private international law."' 55 Comity and the
increasing prevalence of international business transactions and
and people required modernization of private
movement of goods
156
international law.
After finding the existence of a "real and substantial connection,"
the Court then proceeded to analyze the applicability of the fraud,
public policy and natural justice defenses to recognition. 57 These
common law defenses struck the necessary "balance between order
and fairness as well as the real and substantial connection test"
required by comity. 5 '
The natural justice defense required proof that the foreign
proceedings were "contrary to Canadian notions of fundamental
justice."'5 9 Canadian courts had a "heightened duty" to protect the
interests of defendants from judgments entered as a result of foreign
proceedings in which "minimum standards of fairness" were not
applied. 6 ° Such fairness standards required compliance with "basic
procedural safeguards such as judicial independence and fair ethical
debtors sought review in the Canadian Supreme Court. Beals, 3 S.C.R.
5-16.
154. Id.

19.

26-27 (concluding "the need to accommodate 'the flow of wealth,
155. Id.
skills and people across state lines' is as much an imperative
internationally as it is interprovincially," quoting Morguard Invs. Ltd., 3
S.C.R. at 1098).
28. (stating that international commerce and the movement of
156. Id.
people are "directly relevant to determining . . . the enforcement of
monetary judgments," quoting Joost Blom, The Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments: Morguard GoesForth into the World, 28 CAN. Bus. L.J. 373,
375 (1997)).
157. The Court held that the judgment debtors voluntarily entered into the
transaction and thus could have reasonably expected to defend
themselves in Florida when the dispute arose and the litigation was
36. However, the judgment debtors elected not to
commenced. Id.
continue their defense, challenge the default judgment or have it set
aside within one year of its entry as was their right. Id. The Court
concluded that the judgment debtor's reliance on negligent legal advice
did not bar enforcement. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.

40.
59.

60. Despite this heightened duty, the burden of proving a
160. Id
violation of natural justice rests with the party resisting recognition. Id.

rules governing the participants in the judicial system."16 ' The Court
included adequate notice and the opportunity to defend as additional
procedural safeguards.' 62 Review of such safeguards was mandatory

despite the increased difficulty of assessment presented by foreign
judgments in comparison to inter-provincial judgments. 63 The defense
issues and could not be used to rewas further limited to procedural
164
litigate the merits of the case.
Applying these rules, the Court concluded there was no violation
of natural justice in this case as to prevent recognition. The judgment
debtors were fully informed of the Florida proceedings and had the
opportunity to defend on numerous occasions which they repeatedly
declined.' 65 Furthermore, the judgment debtors had precise knowledge
of the amount of their financial exposure once they received notice of
to act. 6 6 Other
the amount of the judgment and nevertheless failed
67
inapplicable.
equally
were
defenses to recognition
Natural Justice andForeignJudgments Post-Beals

Several Canadian courts have addressed the natural justice
defense in the years since Beals. The following overview will discuss
post-Beal cases addressing this defense and conclude with the
challenges presented by Yaiguaje v. Chevron Corporation.

The courts addressing the natural justice defense have reiterated
that it relates only to matters of procedure rather than substantive
law and that the burden of proof rests upon the party resisting
recognition.'68 These procedures must afford the litigants minimum
standards of fairness which include notice of the plaintiffs' claims,
identification of the amount of damages and their methods of
161. Id.

62.

162. Id.

65.

62.
163. Id.
64.
164. Id.
165. Id. 69.
166. Id.
167. The failure of the judgment debtors to defend the litigation in Florida
prevented them from challenging the evidence presented on the question
was
of damages and from presenting evidence that any fraud

undiscoverable.

Id.

54-55.

The

public

policy

defense

was

inapplicable despite the fact that a Canadian court would not reach a
similar conclusion or render a damages award in a similar amount. Id.
76. The allegedly excessive amount of the Florida judgment and its
likely unacceptable nature to most Canadians did not prevent
recognition. Id.
77.
168. See Minn. Valley Alfalfa Producers Coop. v. Baloun, [2005] A.J. No.
24 (Q.B.); see also Sincies Chiementin S.p.A. v. King, [2010] O.J.
174,
No. 5124,
82 (S.C.).

calculation, an opportunity to respond, and full appellate review.'69
Failure to challenge the fundamental fairness of the foreign proceeding
at either the trial or appellate levels may prevent an attack upon the
fairness of the proceeding in a subsequent recognition action. 7 '
Although Canadian courts have been reluctant to utilize the
natural justice defense, two Canadian courts have identified instances
where utilization of the defense may be appropriate. In Litecubes,
L.L.C.

v. Northern Light Products, Inc.,

the

Supreme

Court

of

British Columbia stated that the failure of a foreign court to timely
determine challenges to its jurisdiction such that the defendant would
risk the entry of a default judgment may be considered by local courts
in determining the applicability of the natural justice defense. 7 '
However, the court concluded it did not need to determine this issue
as the defendant had not challenged the fairness of the proceedings
before the foreign court. 72
A second circumstance implicating the natural justice defense is
the

existence of judicial bias. In Ultracuts Franchises,Inc. v. Wal-

Mart Canada Corporation, the Manitoba Court of the Queen's Bench
was confronted with a challenge to recognition of an Arkansas
judgment on the basis of judicial bias.'73 The court defined bias
sufficient to meet the requirements of the natural justice defense as "a
state of mind that is in some way predisposed to a particular result;
or that is closed with regard to particular issues."'17 4 Proof of actual
bias was not required as the court deemed it impossible to determine
whether the decision-maker approached the case with a "truly biased
state of mind."' 75 Rather, particular conduct may give rise to a
40 (C.A.);
169. See, e.g., S. Pac. Imps., Inc. v. Ho, [2009] B.C.J. No. 733,
22 (S.C.); Bank
Marcus Food Co. v. DiPanfilo, [2012] 109 O.R.3d 535,
46 (S.C.).
of Mong. v. Taskin, [2011] O.J. No. 4572,
170. See, e.g., Cook Nook Hazelton Lanes,
19 (S.C.).
O.J. No. 3354,
171.

[2009] B.C.J. No. 262,

Ltd.

v. Trudeau Corp.,

[2003]

44 (S.C.).

172. Id.
173. [2005] 196 Man. R.2d 163 (Q.B.). The defendant's bias claim was based
on four separate grounds. These were: (1)judges in Arkansas are elected
rather than appointed; (2) Wal-Mart is a powerful corporation
possessing undue influence in Arkansas; (3) the trial court judge and one
of the appellate court judges owned shares of Wal-Mart at the time of
their decisions; and (4) the two judges in question failed to disclose their
shareholdings. Id. 3.
174. Id. 17.
175. Id. 17. But seeOakwell Eng'g, Ltd. v. Enernorth Indus., Inc., [2006]
22 (C.A.) (holding that "Beals makes it clear, in my
81 O.R.3d 288,
view, that . . .the party asserting bias must prove actual corruption or
bias").

reasonable apprehension of bias.' 76 Reasonable apprehension requires
proof that not only is the apprehension of bias reasonable but also
that the person considering the alleged bias is reasonable and
possesses "knowledge of all the relevant circumstances, including the
'traditions of integrity and impartiality,"' and the "social reality" that
may influence a case.'77 The burden of proof rests with the party
claiming bias and is high given that such an allegation calls into
question not only the integrity of the judge but also the
The serious nature of such an allegation
administration of justice.'
also requires that the party alleging bias afford the judge whose
conduct is at issue the opportunity to take corrective action including
recusal unless such a request is demonstratively futile.'79
The burden upon a party alleging judicial bias is further
heightened by the presumption that judges will faithfully execute
their oaths of office in a fair and impartial manner.8 0 This
Such
presumption may be overcome only by "cogent evidence."''
evidence may consist of scholarly studies of the judicial system,
reviews of outcomes of claims against the party alleging bias, an
analysis of past claims in which bias was demonstrated, and
testimony of people employed by the judicial system and others.'82
Innuendo and evidence of corruption in the judicial system in general

176. Ultracuts Franchises,Inc., 196 Man. R.2d 163,

17 (citing Wewaykum

Indian Band v. Canada, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 259, 1 60; R. v. R.D.S., [1997] 3

S.C.R. 484,

31, 111).

177. Id. (citing R. v. R.D.S., 3 S.C.R. 484,

7 111-12).

178. Id.(citing Wewaykum Indian Band, 2 S.C.R. 259,
113-14).
R.D.S., 3 S.C.R. 484,

179. Id.

76-77; R. v.

82, 88-89 (citing Robertson v. Edmonton (City) Police Serv.,

[2004] A.J.

No. 805,

118 (Q.B.)).

According to the court, this

prerequisite "respects the jurisdiction of the tribunal and the
adjudicator, . . . prevents unnecessary interference [by the reviewing
court] ....[is] faster and cheaper, ....will have a tempering effect on
the type of allegations of bias that are made .... and .. .[will] place
83
on the record the facts relevant to the bias application." Id.
(quoting Robertson, A.J. No. 805,

120).

180. Id. 1 17, 50 (citing United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421 (1941)

in which the Court stated judges "are assumed to be [people] of
conscience and intellectual discipline, capable of judging a particular
controversy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances").
181. Id. 17. However, the Manitoba Court of the Queen's Bench also
referred to the burden on the party alleging bias as "convincing
evidence," "clear evidence," and "substantial evidence." Id. 17, 50,
52.
182. Id. 74.

without specific application to the case at issue are insufficient to
meet this evidentiary burden." 3
One of the legacies of Beals and its progeny is liberality in the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.' 84 However, past
recognition actions have not addressed difficult cases but rather have
concerned U.S. court judgments, "I judgments of courts with a shared
legal heritage'86 or a perceived level of reliability. 87 Canadian courts
183. Id.
79. Ultracuts' claim of judicial bias ultimately failed due to its
reliance on innuendo and inability to produce studies, outcomes and
testimony. See also Oakwell Eng'g, Ltd. v. Enernorth Indus., Inc., [2006]
81 O.R.3d 288, 23 (C.A.).
184. See, e.g., ELLYN & YOUSSOUFIAN, supra note 128, at I (describing
Ontario courts as "very receptive to the enforcement of final and
conclusive
foreign money judgments"); Richard Frimpong Oppong,
Enforcing Foreign Non-Money Judgments: An Examination of Some Recent
Developments in Canada and Beyond, 39 U. BRIT COLUM. L. REv. 257,

257 (2006) (describing the liberalization of the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments in Canada as a "quiet revolution");
Allison M. Sears, Beals v. Saldanha: The International Implications of
Morguard Made Clear, 68 SASK. L. REv. 223, 238 (2005) (describing

Canada as taking "a generous approach to the enforceability of
international judgments"); Ronald A. Brand, Punitive Damages
Revisited: Taking the Rationale for Non-Recognition of Foreign Judgments
Too Far 22 (Univ. of Pittsburgh School of Law, Working Paper No.
26, 2005) (describing the Canadian approach to the recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments as a "liberal approach
...that is appropriate in a modern business climate").
185.

See, e.g., Davidson v. Lesenko, [2008] 452 A.R. 269 (Q.B.) (California
judgment); Bad Ass Coffee Co. of Haw., Inc. v. Bad Ass Enters., Inc.,
[2007] 427 A.R. 241 (Q.B.) (Utah judgment); Minn. Valley Alfalfa
Producers Coop. v. Baloun, [2005] A.J. No. 174 (Q.B.) (Minnesota
judgment); Nunes v. Collins, [2012] B.C.J. No. 835 (S.C.) (Nevada

judgment); Litecubes, L.L.C. v. N. Light Prods., Inc., [2009] B.C.J. No.
262 (S.C.) (Missouri judgment); Marx v. Balak, [2008] B.C.J. No. 252
(S.C.) (Utah judgment); Suncom, Inc. v. Andrew Stone Casino
Promotions, Inc., [2007] B.C.J. No. 2818 (S.C.) (Nevada judgment);
Garner Estate v. Garner, [2007] 68 B.C.L.R.4th 150 (S.C.) (Oregon
judgment); Lang v. Lapp, [2010] 11 B.C.L.R.5th 280 (C.A.) (California
judgment); Ultracuts Franchises, Inc., 196 Man. R.2d 163 (Arkansas

judgment); Marcus Food Co. v. DiPanfilo, [2012] 109 O.R.3d 535 (S.C.)
(Kansas judgment); Disney Enters., Inc. v. Click Enters., Inc., [2006]
267 D.L.R.4th 291 (S.C.) (New York judgment). One commentator has
concluded that the relative ease with which the Canadian Supreme
Court adopted its liberal approach to recognition was due "largely to
the similarity between the Canadian and
Sears, supra note 184, at 219.
186. See, e.g., Soc'y of Lloyd's v. Berezowski,
(English judgment).

American legal systems."
[2006] 405 A.R. 220 (Q.B.)

187. See, e.g., Grundstuecksverwaltungsgesellschaft MBH & Co. v. Hanne,
[2011] 505 A.R.
364 (C.A.) (German judgment); Commerzbank
Aktiengesellschaft v. Hanne, [2006] 400 A.R. 255 (Q.B.) (German

have not been confronted by an extraordinarily large judgment
entered by a court in the developing world as is presented by
Yaiguaje v. Chevron Corporation.The approach

taken by the Ontario

courts and, ultimately, the Canadian Supreme Court, will have a
lasting impact upon the reputation and credibility of the judiciary
and will require greater elaboration of the natural justice defense.' 88
V. NATURAL JUSTICE AND YAIGUAJEv. CHEVRON
CORPORA TION
Introduction

The natural justice defense may be most effectively applied to
deny recognition of the Judgment in Canada
in two separate
circumstances. An initial challenge to recognition may be posed as a
result of the numerous and significant procedural irregularities that
plagued the Superior Court proceedings. A second challenge to
recognition arises from evidence demonstrating the absence of
independence, bias and conflict of interest. The following section of
the article examines these grounds for denying recognition of the
Judgment in Canada.

judgment); Sincies Chiementin S.p.A. v. King, [2010] O.J. No. 5124
(O.S.C.J.) (Italian judgment); Oakwell Eng'g, Ltd.,
81 O.R.3d 288
(Singaporean judgment); Cook Nook Hazelton Lanes, Ltd. v. Trudeau
Corp., [2003] O.J. No. 3354 (S.C.) (French judgment).
188.

See, e.g., Tanya J. Monestier, Foreign Judgments at Common Law:
Rethinking the Enforcement Rules, 28 DALHOUSIE L.J. 163, 180 (2005) (noting
"foreign means foreign - the [Beals] test, in theory, would apply equally
and indiscriminately to judgments from the U.S., Ghana, Uzbekistan,
Romania and Burkina Faso"); Antonin I. Pribetic, "Strangers in a
Strange Land"- Transnational Litigation, ForeignJudgment Recognition, and
Enforcement in Ontario, J. TRANSNAT'L L.
& POL'Y 347, 388 (2004) (concluding the lack of clarity in the Canadian
recognition rules after the decision in Beals "begs the question whether .
• . 'hard cases' will continue to put pressure on the traditional doctrine
that an enforceable foreign judgment is conclusive on the merits"). One
commentator prophetically summarized the dilemma confronting
Canadian courts as has now come to pass in Yaiguaje v. Chevron
Corporation as follows:
[o]ne is left wondering, how far does the principle of
international comity extend? Would the Court have been so
eager to enforce a judgment from a system more alien to
Canada's than that of our neighbour to the south? It will be
interesting to see how courts will apply the dicta from Beals
when they are faced with judgments emanating from foreign
states whose judicial processes and protections are less congruent
with Canada's.
Sears, supra note 184, at 242-43.

ProceduralIrregularities

Any discussion of procedural irregularities must start with the
proposition that Canadian law does not require foreign proceedings to
be identical to those utilized in Canada in order for recognition to
occur. Courts have disregarded differences in evidentiary rules
evidence would be admissible or
including whether certain
inadmissible in a similar Canadian proceeding.'89 Procedural rules
beyond evidentiary matters do not need to be identical or even nearly
identical for a court to recognize and allow enforcement of a foreign
judgment within Canada. 9 Procedural rules are of little or no interest
to Canadian courts in recognition actions even in the event of
irregularities resulting from the foreign court's non-compliance with
its own applicable procedures. 9'
The sole exception to the inconsequential nature of procedural
rules is the existence of a fundamental flaw in the foreign
proceedings. 92 Several Canadian courts have narrowly defined these
fundamental flaws to include inadequate notice, denial of the right to
be heard, and bias.' 93 Utilizing this narrow standard, the likelihood of
successful utilization of the natural justice defense is unlikely with
respect to notice and denial of the right to be heard. Chevron clearly
had notice of the Plaintiffs' claims dating back to their original filing
against Texaco in the United States in 1993. These claims remained
pending at the time of Chevron's acquisition of Texaco in 2001.
Chevron was further notified of the claims after their re-filing in
Ecuador in 2003. Chevron's defenses to these claims, although
disregarded, were clearly heard in the course of the eight years in
which the litigation was pending before the trial court and additional
189. See, e.g., Soc'y of Lloyd's v. Meinzer, [2001] 55 O.R. 3d,
KOEHNEN & KLEIN, supra note 127, at 35.

21 (C.A.);

24 (holding "[t]he procedural rules
190. Marcus Food Co., 109 O.R.3d 535,
and safeguards that exist in Ontario are not the only ones that comply
with the principles of natural justice").
12;
191. See, e.g., Pro Swing, Inc. v. Elta Golf, Inc., [2006] 2 S.C.R. 612,
WALKER, supra note 140, §64.05[2] (rejecting consideration of procedural
irregularities as embroiling the enforcing court in an impermissible
"review of the decision-making process of the issuing court").
192. See KOEHNEN & KLEIN, supra note 127, at 35.
40 (C.A.)
193. See, e.g., S. Pac. Imps., Inc. v. Ho, [2009] B.C.J. No. 733,
(service of process, opportunity to respond and full appellate review);
Suncom, Inc. v. Andrew Stone Casino Promotions, Inc., [20007] B.C.J.
31 (S.C.) (notice and opportunity to defend); Cortes v.
No. 2818,
Yorktown Sec., Inc., [2007] B.C.W.L.D. 2086 (S.C.) (adequacy of
notice); Arcadia Int'l L.L.C. v. Janmeja, [2008] N.S.J. No. 147 (S.C.)
(adequacy of notice); Bank of Mong. v. Taskin, [2011] O.J. No. 4572,
44-46 (S.C.) (notice, opportunity to defend and knowledge of the
amount of damages).

year for appellate review. Chevron was not limited in any manner in
the number of pleadings filed in response to the Plaintiffs' claims at
trial and on appeal. These pleadings number in the thousands of
pages including exhibits. Additionally, Chevron's right to adduce
evidence and present it to the trial and appellate courts was equally
unimpaired. The presence of possible bias in the proceedings presents
a much stronger defense to recognition than notice and the right to be
heard.194

Other courts considering foreign judgments have utilized broader
language to describe the procedural irregularities sufficient to prevent
recognition. The standards established by these courts have been
described as requiring "minimum standards of fairness" and "due
process"' 95 and the avoidance of "flagrant" breaches of natural
justice.'96 These standards include the inability to present defenses
relating to jurisdiction and delays by the foreign court in considering
such defenses without the risk of entry of a default judgment.'97
The possibility of a successful use of the natural justice defense
increases significantly if this broader approach is utilized in reviewing
the procedures that resulted in the Judgment. The totality of the
circumstances resulting in the entry of the Judgment reveals a pattern
of significant departure from applicable procedural rules commencing
early in the Ecuadorian proceedings with the Superior Court's failure
to timely rule on Chevron's motion to dismiss.'98 Further procedural
irregularities surrounded the abrupt abandonment of the joint
evidence collection plan, appointment of Cabrera, and failure to
conduct hearings regarding this appointment and the integrity of his
collection procedures and resultant report.'9 9 The procedural failures
and lack of judicial oversight with respect to Cabrera's activities are
particularly egregious given the allegations of violation of his mandate
in assessing damages beyond environmental injury, improper
194. See infra notes 226-57 and accompanying text.

60, 64; Skippings Rutley v.

195. Beals v. Saldanha, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 416,
Darragh, [2008] B.C.J. No. 287,

13 (S.C.).

196. Angba v. Marie, [2004] F.C.J. No. 2126,

17 (Fed. Ct.).

44
197. Litecubes, L.L.C. v. N. Light Prods., Inc., [2009] B.C.J. No. 262
(S.C.). The British Columbia Supreme Court held in this regard that:
[e]vidence of whether or not the defendant had a procedural
opportunity for a period of attomment immunity in the foreign
court, to enable it to contest jurisdiction and to not run the risk
of a default judgment, may be something the local courts will
want to consider in determining [the natural justice defense].
Id.

198. Id.
199. See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.

collaboration with Plaintiffs' representatives in violation of his
independent status and disputed authorship of his report. 0 Despite
the gravity of these claims, the Superior Court refused to investigate
their veracity in a meaningful fashion. 0 An additional procedural
deficiency exists in the Superior Court's penalization of the right to
appeal by doubling the amount of damages unless Chevron waived
such right and issued a public apology within fifteen days of the entry
of the Judgment.0 2 The Provincial Court endorsed these irregularities
on appeal in its decisions declining to investigate the Superior Court's
departures from applicable procedures and affirming the Judgment.0 3
Arguably any of these anomalies standing alone could result in a
decision to decline recognition of the Judgment in Canada on the
basis of an expanded approach to natural justice in the context of
foreign court procedures. The weight of these irregularities when
considered as a whole is most likely sufficient to overcome the
disinterest of Canadian courts in foreign procedures and prevent
recognition of the Judgment.
The EcuadorianJudicialSystem
Chevron may also elect to initiate a broader attack on the
operation of the Ecuadorian judicial system. This attack would most
likely focus on two closely related factors, specifically, the absence of
judicial independence and bias. The combination of these factors may
be sufficient to overcome the traditional reluctance of Canadian
courts to "reach deeply into the structure of the domestic court's
justice system."20 4 This reluctance may be further eroded by the
legal systems.
of the Canadian and Ecuadorian
incongruity
Recognition opinions to date have addressed foreign judgments
originating from jurisdictions with similar provenance or deemed
inherently reliable.2 5 By contrast, the Ecuadorian system does not
share a similar heritage nor is entitled to a presumption of reliability
of
Assumptions
to other considered jurisdictions.
equivalent
independence and the absence of bias and conflict of interest
regarding foreign judicial systems contained in previous opinions
cannot be made in this case. 6
200. See supra notes 54, 65-66, 113, 116-17 and accompanying text.
201. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.

202. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
204. Pro Swing, Inc. v. Elta Golf, Inc., [2006] 2 S.C.R. 612,

13.

205. See supra notes 185-87 and accompanying text.
206. See Beals v. Saldanha, [2003] 3 S.C.R.

416,

62 (noting that the

assessment of "basic procedural safeguards such as judicial independence
and fair ethical rules . . . .is easier when the foreign legal system is
either similar to or familiar to Canadian courts").

The judicial independence necessary for the recognition of a
foreign judgment is lacking in this case more than in any previous
circumstance confronting Canadian courts. From a macro-level, the
Ecuadorian judicial system has been plagued by a perceived lack of
independence since the Ecuadorian Congress and then-President Lucio
Gutidrrez purged the country's three highest judicial tribunals
including the Supreme Court in 2004 and 2005 .207 The newlyappointed Supreme Court declared the power to appoint and reappoint lower court judges to four year terms in November 2005.218
The effect of this declaration was to make re-appointment contingent
upon "whether [judges'] rulings demonstrated their loyalty to the
positions held by the higher-court judges who appointed them."209
This lack of independence further deteriorated upon President
Correa's assumption of office in November 2006. The judiciary was
again purged through the removal of all of the judges sitting on the
Constitutional Tribunal and their replacement with appointees
deemed loyal to President Correa."' Ecuador's new constitution
adopted the following spring declared the supremacy of the legislative
branch over the judiciary, which primacy was upheld by the
Constitutional Tribunal. 21 In addition to these manipulations of the
judicial system, the Correa administration has been accused of
threatening judges with violence, removal and prosecution 21 in
2
instances where they have ruled against the government's interests.
These developments have led commentators to conclude the rule of
law is not respected in Ecuador in cases where the political interests
of the Correa administration are at stake. 2 3 These conclusions have

207.

VLADIMIRO

SYSTEM

ALVAREZ GRAU, REPORT ON THE ECUADORIAN JUDICIAL
30-33 (Sept. 2010), cited in Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768

F. Supp.2d 581, 617 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) [hereinafter Alvarez Report].
Alvarez has been described as "an impressively credentialed expert"
with forty years of experience as a practicing attorney, elected and
appointed government official and academic in Ecuador. Donziger, 768
F. Supp.2dat 616 n.163.
208. Alvarez Report, supra note 207, 33.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.

37-40.
44.

212. Id.

56-59.

213. Id.
62, 69, 82, 87 (quoting former legislators, judges and attorneys as
describing the judicial system in Ecuador as "completely collapsed,"
lacking "integrity and firmness in applying the law and administering
justice," in a state of "institutional crisis," operating under "ruinous"
political influence, and exemplified by "corruption at every step, delays
all around, alarming incompetence, undue pressure and influence . . . to
the point that at this time justice in Ecuador is just one more item up

been echoed in reports of international organizations 14 and national
governments" 5 and one judicial opinion in the United States." 6
Specific examples of this lack of independence arose throughout
the Lago Agrio litigation and subsequent appeal. Chevron claimed the
Superior Court lacked independence as early as July 2006 when it
abandoned the joint evidence collection plan at the behest of the
Correa campaign and as a result of pressure exerted by the Plaintiffs

for sale"). Based upon his analysis and
preparation of his report, Alvarez concluded:

interviews

conducted

in

[t]he cumulative effect of the political pressure on the Judiciary
cannot be overstated . . . . The situation has become so dire
that, in those cases where President Correa or others in his
administration express a view, the judge must either rule
accordingly or face the high likelihood of public condemnation,
removal from office, and even criminal prosecution .... It is not
possible to rely on the independence of the Judicial Branch,
because it no longer acts impartially, with integrity and firmness
in applying the law and administering justice. Rather, on the
contrary, members of the Judiciary are subject to constant
pressure, temptations and threats that influence their decisions.
Id.

82, 87.

214. See, e.g., WORLD BANK, WORLDWIDE GOVERNANCE INDICATOR (2009),
available at http://info.worldbank.org/wgi/sc country.asp
(ranking
Ecuador in the eighth percentile of the 213 economies studied with
FORUM, GLOBAL
respect to the rule of law); WORLD ECON.
tbl.
1.06
(2011),
available at
COMPETITIVENESS
REPORT,
(ranking
http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-2011-2012
Ecuador 130th out of 142 countries surveyed for judicial independence).
215. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: ECUADOR § 1(e)
(2010), available at http://www.state.gov./i/drl/rls/hrrpt/2O10/wha/
154504.htm (concluding that "[w]hile the Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, in practice the judiciary was at times susceptible
to outside pressure and corruption . . . . Judges occasionally reached
decisions based on media influence or political and economic pressures");
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENT FOR ECUADOR

(2010), available at http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/rls/othr/ics/2010/1380
60.htm (concluding that "[s]ystemic weakness in the judicial system and
pressures constitute
its susceptibility to political and economic
important problems faced by U.S. companies investing in or trading
with Ecuador . . . .Concerns have been raised in the media and by the
private sector that Ecuadorian courts may be susceptible to outside
pressure.").
216. See Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp.2d 581, 633, 636 (S.D.N.Y.
2011) (in which the court concluded "there is abundant evidence ...
that Ecuador has not provided impartial tribunals or procedures
compatible with due process of law, at least at the time period relevant
here, especially in cases such as this" and "Chevron is . . . likely to
prevail on its contention" regarding the absence of impartial tribunals
and procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law).

regarding the filing of a complaint alleging judicial misconduct." 7
Further lack of independence may be inferred from the Superior
Court's disregard of objections to Cabrera's collection and analysis
procedures, which included allegations of significant departures from
accepted methodologies, violations of the mandate governing his
appointment, and manipulation and alteration of evidence.218 This
lack of independence in the supervision of Cabrera resulted in the
outcome desired by the Correa administration, specifically, disregard
of the remediation agreements and release and assessment of a multibillion dollar award placing the blame for all injuries incurred as a
result of the Consortium's operations entirely on Chevron.219 The
appellate court ensured this result remained in place through its
cursory examination of the circumstances surrounding
Cabrera's
appointment and refusal to investigate Chevron's claims of fraud,
misconduct and procedural irregularities.2 °
The Superior Court's lack of independence was not limited to
Cabrera and his activities. President Correa exerted pressure on the
court through numerous public statements supportive of the
Plaintiffs' cause and condemning Chevron, offering government
support
in evidence collection, and instigating
the criminal
prosecution of individuals involved in the negotiation of the
remediation agreements and release.2 The pressure placed upon the
Superior Court was intensified by actions and statements of the
Ecuadorian Attorney General's office and members of the Constituent
Assembly.222 The message to the Superior Court from these actions
was unmistakably clear. This message was certainly not lost on the
Plaintiffs as demonstrated by the comments of one of their
representatives acknowledging the importance of politics, pressure,
intimidation, and humiliation to the outcome of the case.223
The alleged lack of independence could perhaps be dismissed as
no more than expressions of disappointment and frustration by an
unsuccessful litigant. However, these allegations have been affirmed
by two separate and independent tribunals. The most comprehensive
findings in this regard are contained in In re Application of Chevron
Corporation in which the
district
court
concluded
politics,
intimidation and corruption may have influenced the appointment of

217. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 54, 59 and accompanying text.
220. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
221.

See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.

222. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
223. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.

Cabrera and the outcome of the litigation.2 24 Additional support for
these allegations may be found in the Third Interim Award in
Chevron Corporation v. Republic of Ecuador in which the Permanent

Court of Arbitration found Chevron's claims of government collusion
with the Plaintiffs and abuse of the criminal justice system not to be
interposed in bad faith nor frivolous or vexatious. 2 5 Although the
outcome of this arbitration as well as a related judicial proceeding in
the United States remain to be determined, the findings of these
tribunals lends credence to Chevron's claims of political interference
with the operation of an independent judiciary in this case.
JudicialBias

A more difficult burden rests on Chevron to establish a reasonable
apprehension of bias sufficient to prevent recognition of the
Judgment. The issue to be addressed is whether a reasonable person
well-informed of the facts at issue and viewing them realistically and
practically would conclude that it is more likely than not that the
decision-maker did not decide the case in a fair manner. 226 Any finding
of bias must be supported by evidence produced by the proponent
and
"convincing,"
as "cogent,"
characterized
alternatively 227
"substantial." ' Despite these obstacles, Chevron can meet its burden
in this case.
Initially, the evidence of lack of judicial independence lends itself
an
argument that the Judgment was also a product of bias. The
to
deference to pressures brought to bear by other branches of the
Ecuadorian government and the Plaintiffs supports a conclusion that
the Judgment was not the product of impartial and neutral
consideration of the evidence but rather was the result of a process
significantly tilted in favor of a finding of liability.228 The evidence in
support of such a conclusion is significant. The disregard of the
mutually-agreed upon joint evidence collection process, the unilateral
appointment of Cabrera and subsequent disregard of problems with
his methodology, analysis and conclusions readily lends itself to a
conclusion that the Superior Court was motivated by something other
than the fair dispensation of justice. 229 The failure of the appellate
224. 749 F. Supp.2d 141, 144-45, 147, 150, 152. See also supra notes 114-15
and accompanying text.
225. Third Interim Award, supra note 12
124-27 and accompanying text.

4.57-4.58. Seealso supra notes

226. Ultracuts Franchises, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Canada Corp., [2005] 196 Man.
17 (Q.B.).
R.2d 163
227. Id.

17, 51-52.

228. See supra notes 69-72, 115, 221-23 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 50-51, 53-55, 59, 82, 217-20 and accompanying text.

court to thoroughly investigate these allegations is not only relevant
to the existence of an independent judicial system but also must be
considered in the context of whether Chevron was afforded a neutral
forum untainted by a pre-determined outcome.23 ° Additional support
for this conclusion may be found in the portion of the Judgment
conditioning Chevron's liability for half of the award on its issuance of
a public apology. 3 ' The general perceptions of the Ecuadorian judicial
system by knowledgeable experts, international organizations and
country-specific sources further supports the contention that the
Judgment was a product of bias. 2
The existence of bias in this case is strengthened by the presence
of two additional factors. The initial factor is the existence of
videotaped conversations between Nufiez, government officials and
third parties in which the possible outcome of the case was discussed,
the involvement of the Ecuadorian government throughout the
proceedings was confirmed and a possible payoff to Nufiez was
proposed. 33 These discussions were in addition to previous statements
made by Nufiez regarding the outcome of the litigation prior to the
completion of his review of the evidence.234 Although Nufiez eventually
recused himself from the case, his successor proved equally susceptible
to outside influences in the administration of2justice.35
An additional factor strengthening the presence of bias is the
numerous determinations by independent courts regarding the
Ecuadorian proceedings. These courts have painted an unflattering
portrait of the conduct of the Superior Court and one of the
Plaintiffs' representatives. Three separate U.S. courts have described
the proceedings in Ecuador as tainted by fraud,23 6 and another
characterized the conduct it examined as "inappropriate, unethical
' The federal
and perhaps illegal."237
court with the closest relationship
to the proceedings, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
230. See supra notes 82, 220 and accompanying text.
231. See supra note 83, 202 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 207-16 and accompanying text.
233. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
234. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
235. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
236. See In re Application of Chevron Corp., 633 F.3d 153, 166 (3d Cir.
2011); Chevron Corp. v. E-Tech Int'l, No.cv1 146-lEG (WMc), 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 94396, at *17 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2010); Chevron Corp. v.
Camp, No. 1:10mc27, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97440, at *16 (W.D.N.C.
Aug. 30, 2010). See also supra note 117 and accompanying text.
237. In re Chevron Corp., No. 0-MC-21JH/LFG, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
119943, at *6 (D.N.M. Sept. 1, 2010). Seealso supra note 131 and
accompanying text.

of New York, has made extensive findings regarding the judicial
process in Ecuador in this case. These findings include "possible fraud
and misconduct,"
"political activity
[and] intimidation of the
Ecuadorian
courts," and corruption.23
The presence of these
assessments by independent tribunals sets this recognition proceeding
apart from others conducted by Canadian courts and is of substantial
assistance to Chevron in meeting its burden of proving the existence
of a reasonable apprehension of bias. Any bias argument advanced in
this proceeding would not be supported merely by allegations and
evidence provided by the proponent but also would be supported by
findings of neutral tribunals from a jurisdiction closely resembling
Canada with respect to procedures and notions of due process.
The presence of these factors distinguishes this case from the
detailed examination and ultimate rejection of judicial bias in the
context of a recognition proceeding set forth in Ultracuts Franchises,
Inc. v. Wal-Mart Canada Corporation. An additional
four
distinguishing factors are present in this case. Initially, unlike the
decision in Ultracuts, the party seeking recognition admitted that the
23 9
Judgment was the product of a corrupt judicial system.
A second distinguishing
factor is the inapplicability of the
presumption of impartiality. The court in Ultracuts refused to find a
reasonable apprehension of bias in part based upon the assumption
that judges are "people of conscience and intellectual discipline,
capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its
own circumstances. '24" This assumption has led Canadian courts to be
hesitant in finding bias. Such assumption and resultant hesitancy is
not appropriate in this case. Any Canadian court called upon to grant
recognition to the Judgment will not be reviewing a U.S. court
decision but will instead be asked to affirm the product of a deeply
flawed judicial system dissimilar to the Canadian system and located
in the developing world. The flaws existing in this system and on full
display throughout the proceedings before the Superior Court are not
imaginary nor the product of an overly aggressive litigation strategy.
To the contrary, the problems plaguing the conduct of the litigation
including the possibility of judicial bias, are well-documented and
supported
by
numerous
independent authorities
including
international organizations, the U.S. government and U.S. and
international tribunals. The presence of such evidence distinguishes
this case from the general and unsupported allegation of bias
unsuccessfully advanced in Ultracuts. This is not to conclude that all
238:

In re Application of Chevron Corp.,

749 F. Supp.2d 141, 144-45,

147,

157-58 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).

239. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.

240. Ultracuts Franchises, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Canada Corp., [2005] 196 Man.
R.2d 163

50 (Q.B.).

judicial decisions issued by courts in the developing world are
inherently suspect and should not be afforded the presumption in
favor of judicial impartiality. Rather, it is to conclude that, in this
case, the presumption is inapplicable given the combination of welldocumented allegations of procedural irregularities, the lack of judicial
independence, and their confirmation by numerous independent and
well-regarded sources.
A third distinguishing factor is the presence of a direct pecuniary
interest in the outcome of the litigation. The court in Ultracuts
acknowledged that a financial or pecuniary interest in a party or the
subject matter of a claim could serve to disqualify a judge in a given
'
case.24 ' However, the interest was required to be "direct."242
The fact
that a judge has a shareholding interest in a party to the litigation
without more does not satisfy the "direct interest" standard. 243 The
financial interest of the Superior Court in the outcome of the
litigation was well beyond a shareholding interest and in fact could
not be any more direct. The failure of the Superior Court to decide
the case in a manner consistent with the viewpoint of the Correa
administration could have resulted in the removal of Nufiez or
Zambrano from office and criminal prosecution.244 This possibility was
reinforced by actions and statements of the Ecuadorian Attorney
General's office and members of the Constituent Assembly. 45 This
possibility was also documented by a wide variety of independent and
well-respected sources. 246 An additional direct financial interest was
present in the discussions concerning a possible payoff of Nufiez from
proceeds of any judgment that he might enter in the case. 247 The
presence of these factors creates a distinct possibility of a direct
pecuniary interest and a reasonable apprehension of bias in the
outcome of the litigation. It also clearly distinguishes the court's
refusal to deny recognition to a judgment due to the shareholdings of
two of the ten judges involved in the three levels of hearings at issue
in Ultracuts.
The court's refusal to deny recognition to the judgment in
Ultracuts due to the shareholdings of two of the ten judges involved
in the decision process is important for another reason as well. Any
possible bias was mitigated by the fact that
the ultimate
determination of the case rested on the decisions of multiple judges at
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three different levels of review. 48 The court noted that the decision of
the Arkansas Supreme Court upholding the result against Ultracuts
was unanimous and was authored by a member of the court who was
not a Wal-Mart shareholder.2 49 This was not a case where the
allegedly tainted judge cast the deciding vote in a split decision.'
It
could not be reasonably inferred under such circumstances that any
bias of the single shareholding member of the court, should such exist,
tainted the conclusions reached by the other five members of the
appellate panel.251 However, such was not the circumstance in
Ecuador where a single trial judge possessing plenary power was solely
responsible for the outcome of the litigation subject to review by
another single appellate judge. The Ultracuts court concluded that
"[w]here six judges on an American court of appeal hear and
unanimously decide a case, it is difficult to imagine any reasonable
person believing that one judge would have been able to sway all of
'
his colleagues to decide the case in a biased manner. 252
By contrast,
it is not so difficult to imagine bias by a single decision-maker lacking
independence and operating in a legal system as flawed as the one
presently existing in Ecuador.
It may be contended that the persuasiveness of these arguments is
undercut by two factors cited with approval in Ultracuts. Ultracuts
requires bias claims to be supported by factual evidence which "could
take the form of scientific studies of the court system, a review of the
outcome of claims against the company, an analysis of past decisions
demonstrating some bias, evidence of people involved in the justice
'
system . . . [or] evidence from employees of the company."253
Chevron
has arguably satisfied this burden through citation of the numerous
incidents of procedural irregularities, political interference with
judicial processes and the previously-mentioned judicial bias. The
conclusions drawn from these incidents are reinforced by studies of
international organizations and the U.S. government and findings of
several U.S. courts. Although these studies and findings are not
necessarily "scientific," they are more than adequate to support a
conclusion of judicial bias. Furthermore, the Alvarez Report clearly
constitutes "evidence of people involved in the justice system." In any
event, Ultracuts does not require that evidence of bias be supported
by scientific studies and outcome analyses but only that such evidence
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is "factual." This is a burden Chevron has clearly met in this case
especially in comparison to the unsupported allegations of bias
rejected in Ultracuts.
The second factor is efforts by the party resisting recognition to
disqualify the presiding judge. Ultracuts describes the "current
Canadian practice . . . [as providing] that a litigant who wishes to
raise the issue of a judge's bias should make the application to the
judge himself or herself. 254 This prerequisite respects the court's
jurisdiction, prevents interference in trial court decisions by appellate
courts, is cheaper and faster, tempers the frequency and type of
complaints by requiring direct confrontation of the adjudicator and
places on the circumstances surrounding the alleged bias on the
record.255 This approach also permits the judge accused of bias the
opportunity to respond." 6 Admittedly such direct in-court challenges
did not occur in the Ecuadorian litigation prior to the release of the
videotapes purporting to demonstrate Nufiez's predetermination of
the merits of the case.
However, Ultracuts excuses litigants from moving for recusal if
they can demonstrate that to do so would have been futile." 7 Such a
motion undoubtedly would have been futile in this case. The Superior
Court was unlikely to consider a motion to recuse based upon its
demonstrated disregard for compliance with applicable procedures
throughout the trial. Political pressures to reach a desired result and
the possibility of removal and prosecution would also clearly influence
any decision by Nufiez to step aside. The court in Ultracuts also
assumed the potential for bias would be eliminated should a motion
to recuse be successful. Such would not have been the case had
Chevron filed and prevailed upon a motion to recuse Nufiez given that
his replacement would be subject to the same pressures to reach the
result desired by the Ecuadorian
government.
That Nufiez's
replacement was ultimately removed from the bench albeit for
conduct in a different case demonstrates that any motion to recuse
would have been futile given the inescapability of bias in this type of
case.
Despite these two possible shortcomings, a Canadian court could
conclude there is a reasonable apprehension of judicial bias in this
case as to defeat the Plaintiffs' action for recognition. The
circumstances supporting a finding of bias have been considered by
numerous reasonable and informed persons and institutions. These
persons and institutions have reached similar conclusions regarding
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the Ecuadorian judicial system in general and its operation in this
case in particular. Furthermore, the "social reality" emphasized in
Ultracuts leads to the conclusion that the Ecuadorian judicial system
as presently constituted is subject to political pressure, manipulation
and bias in high profile cases such as the Lago Agrio litigation. The
reasonable likelihood of bias when combined with the lack of judicial
independence in general and as specific to this case is sufficient to
deny recognition of the Judgment on the basis of natural justice.
VI. Conclusion
The stakes for the Canadian judicial system arising from the
Statement of Claim are high. Canada is the first jurisdiction to
confront the issue of recognition in proceedings which present
numerous difficult and novel legal questions. Courts will be unable to
assume that the issuing court and judicial system are inherently
reliable given their incongruence with Canadian procedural safeguards
and substantive standards.258 Instead courts called upon to determine
the outcome of the Plaintiffs' recognition request will be required to
reconcile Canada's liberal approach and the many obstacles and
deficiencies within the Judgment and the Ecuadorian judicial system.
This will require revisiting, clarifying and revising defenses to
recognition, including the natural justice defense.259 The Plaintiffs'
recognition action presents an opportunity to account for judgments
emanating from the developing world which will inevitably be
presented for recognition in Canada. By contrast, unwavering
adherence to the liberal approach to recognition would result in an
unfair outcome and cast a negative light on the Canadian judicial
system. This choice may belong to the Canadian Supreme Court in
the not so distant future.
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